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LABOR ADMINISTRATION AND DEMOCRACY IN ARGENTINA
I. I ntroduction
The rrcent transition to democracy experienced by Argentina offers an
excellent opportunity to view the impact that re-democratization in the wake
of authoritarian collapse has on public policy. This is especially the case
for policy areas that are essential elements in the successful consolidation
of a democratic regime. These include social security and welfare services,
the provision of public goods in general, criminal justice, and interest group
intermediation. In modern Argentina, one example of the latter with
ramifications that extend far beyond the scope of interest group politics is
the field of labor relations (which is better conceived as state-labor
relations, for reasons that will become apparent shortly). This is because
organized labor is generally considered to be the most important civilian
political actor (beyond personalities) in postwar Argentina, and as such has
contributed strongly to the zero-sum economic and political competition that
preceeded the democratic regime installed in 1983. Moreover, the Argentine
state (particularly those branches involved in national labor administration),
was instrumental in pushing the Argentine labor movement to its position of
prominence. Since that time (1943-1955), Argentine labor administration has
exhibited the organizational and policy vagaries associated with the
dissimilar labor projects of a diverse array of regimes alternating power in
unpredictable and irregular succession. Given this historical background,
and for reasons that I shall elaborate shortly, Argentine labor administration
now represents the institutional nexus in which the democratic regime headed
by Raul Alfonsin responds to the demands and interests of the reactivated
labor movement. As such, it is a critical actor in a policy area central to
the process of democratic consolidation.
From 1976 to 1983 (as a harsher variant of a repeated theme), Perom'st
unions were the object of a systematic campaign of economic and political
exclusion on the part of the self-styled "Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional"
(Process of National Reorganization). Since Peronist unions then represented
ninety percent of the organized labor force, this meant that the most active
elements in the labor movement were forced into institutional silence. The
exclusion was evident at both the organizational level, in the structure and
function of state agencies charged with labor-related duties, and at the
legislative level, where executive decrees and emergency laws gave it formal
>u*. stance. Beyond that, the wholescale use of state terror added a highly
coercive incentive for labor acquiecence.* Even so, the resilience of the
Perionist unions allowed them to mount the most serious challenges to the
"Proceso" once it began to internally divide in 1981. In fact, it was a
nation-wide strike called by these unions which provided the triggering event
in the timing of the Malvinas re-occupation. As a result, once the "Proceso"
began to collapse in earnest, organized labor played a central role in the
transition process, as it comprised the core of a highly mobilized and
previously disenfranchised mass political movement that in turn represented a
significant portion of the electorate.
In light of these events, this paper proposes to examine the branch of
the state responsible for managing the demands and interests of the organized
labor movement under the new democratic regime in Argentina. The reason for
this stems from the fact that, as the primary institutional framework in which
the structural bases for democratic class compromise between the organized
working classes and competing socioeconomic groups are promoted, Argentine
labor administration constitutes a crucial actor in the current process of
democratic consolidation.
The democratic resurgence in the Southern Cone has already prompted a
spate of work detailing the differences and similarities of each case,
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particularly the conditions and motives for the re-opening of the political
arena, and the terms and character of the ensuing political competition.
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Much less work, however, has been devoted to analyzing the institutional
frameworks used to promote the class compromise necessary for the maintenance
of these nascent democratic systems. Hence, while there are several studies
that examine the frameworks erected within the Argentine, Brazilian, and
Uruguayan states by the previous military-bureaucratic regimes to establish
and maintain their political domination, 3 little attention has been devoted to
studying the institutional frameworks promoted within the national state
apparatus by their freely elected successors in order to establish the
structural bases for class compromise and cooperation deemed necessary for the
maintenance of democracies.
^
II. Defining the Issue
In order to understand why the structural bases of class compromise are
important elements in the process of democratic consolidation, we must refine
our notion of democracy so that it accounts for the various levels at which it
is manifest. This allows us to distinguish between procedural and substantive
democracy. Procedural democracy refers to an instrumental view that emphasizes
formal party competition and open, competitive elections as the hallmarks of
democratic systems. Substantive democracy refers to the three levels involved
in reproducing democratic structures and relationships throughout a polity.
At an institutional level, it is reflected in the general organization and
specific structure and functions of the state apparatus, in the emergence of
an ideologically diverse array of competitive and legally equal political
parties (which may or may not have a class basis), and in the organization and
behavior of the collective agents that emerge to defend and represent the
interests of a variety of social groups (the notions of pluralism and
polyarchy usually apply here). The normative bias of democratic regimes in
favor of legal equality regardless of socioeconomic differences grants eaual
institutional access to the state, and what is more important, guarantees
equal and impartial treatment by it.
The difficulties inherent in attempting to achieve this type of
institutional arrangement are often due to a failure to promote democratic
rules and values at a societal level. At a societal level, the substantive
process of democratization involves the inculcation throughout society of
basic notions of consent, compromise, concession, and legitimate exchange.
This promotes a high degree of tolerance and adherence to the procedural norms
and institutional channels which constitute the basic rules and framework of
the democratic political "game". That in turn allows for the organized
expansion of civil society and the growth of its free expression when
addressing political authorities.
Finally (and usually the most difficult to define and achieve),
substantive democracy is manifest at the economic level. It involves a
general agreement within society which favors political guarantees for the
maintenance of minimum living standards that provide for basic physical and
social needs, as well as ensure just recompensation for individual productive
activity (for example, through welfare legislation and minimum wage
standards). Though it is obvious that there is considerable variation on this
theme, and that the specific policy approaches used are subject to adjustment
and differ from country to country and government to government (such as the
use of Keynesian, "trickle-down", or socialist economic strategies), it
remains clear that this is a fundamental substantive pillar of mature
democratic systems. In fact, the degree to which a society has moved towards
the full achievement of procedural and substantive democracy at all of its
levels (by, among other things, valuing procedural democracy intrinsically,
for itself
,
rather than as a facade, instrument, or ritual) helps us distinguish
between limited, liberal, and radical democratic political systems.
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It is the expansion of civil society, the complexity of its free
expression, and the necessity to arbitrate the claims of competing social
groups while providing minimum economic and welfare standards that together
create the need for democratic state autonomy. Instead of the instrument by
which authoritarian regimes direct a coercive monologue towards subordinate
groups, the democratic state promotes a congenial political environment that
allows individuals to express, through their various collective agents, voices
previously unheard. Coupled with a substantive democratic groundswell at the
societal level (again, marked by a high degree of tolerance, adherence to
procedural norms, and use of institutional channels), dominant and subordinate
groups can thereby engage in a broad based dialogue that defines the precise
degree of consent, concessions, compromise, and exchange involved in the
relationship between democratic representatives and their constituents (in
contrast to the absence of these traits in the relationship between rulers and
ruled under authoritarian regimes). This dialogue defines the institutional
space in which the democratic state mediates the demands of competing groups
while protecting the basic interests of all. It is the expanded ability to
neutrally "hear" the demands of many social groups that broadens the range of
democratic state activity, as well as increase the ability of all political
actors to learn from their interaction a better appreciation of democratic
values and norms.
Procedural democracy, despite the obvious limitations it carries, often
opens the door to more substantive types of democratic change. This can be
considered a top-down process of re-democratization, in which adherence to
procedure clears the way for the institutionalization of democratic structures
that in turn promote the absorption of democratic values and rules throughout
society. In many cases, this form of re-democratization is the designated, if
not natural successor of authoritarian regimes that underwent a process of
liberalization leading to a political opening. Liberalization refers to the
internal dynamic that prompts authoritarian regimes to relinquish political
authority. It is most often a result of economic success or failure (or, as
in the case of Brazil, successive economic success and partial failure), as
well as a diminished sense of threat on the part of regime elites (most often
due to the erradicatior. of subversion and general success in achieving
domestic order)
.
Re-democratization refers to the response of civil society to this or any
other form of authoritarian demise, most evident in the re-establishing of
collective identities, the horizontal expansion of social networks represented
by organized agents, and in the growing level of social expression in all its
guises. As such, it is yery much an external dynamic that serves as an
accelerant to authoritarian liberalization. The regime that governed Brazil
from 1964 until 1985 provides an excellent study in liberalization leading to
re-democratization. Having achieved its primary objectives of economic growth
and subversive eradication by 1973, the Brazilian military-bureaucratic
regime embarked on a period of liberalization that involved a gradual
political distension (distensao) or decompression (descompressao) , followed
by an incremental political opening (abertura) based on the piece-meal
granting of procedural concessions.
This form of re-democratization can be contrasted with a bottom-up
process in which civil society mobilizes and expands the range of its demands
while moving to secure a voice in the political decision-making process.
Broadly evident in the altered tenor of inter-personal discourse, 6 it is
politically manifested in the re-forging of collective identities, and in the
formal posing of group demands and interests against those of competing groups
when addressing the principal repository of legitimate political power: the
state. This form of re-democratization is more likely to germinate in the
political vacuum created by authoritarian collapse or (to a lesser degree)
from a process of voluntary authoritarian withdrawal without liberalization.
A classic recipe for authoritarian collapse is the convergence of internal and
external pressures (such as severe economic crisis compounded by a crisis of
executive succession -- the "Achilles Heel" of BA regimes mentioned by
O'Donnell -- leading to involvement in foreign adventure resulting in defeat
in war), something the Argentine "Proceso" painfully discovered in 1982.
Similarly, the overwhelmingly negative appraisal of its rule given during the
constitutional plebescite staged in 1980 forced the Uruguayan
military-bureaucratic regime to schedule a timetable for prompt democratic
elections without first transiting through a gradual period of liberalization.
Though somewhat more controlled than the process resulting from authoritarian
collapse, such a quick transition to procedural democracy nonetheless provides
an excellent environment for the rapid generation of a substantive democratic
groundswell within civil society.
Time and space constraints preclude at this point a more extensive
comparison with the Brazilian and Uruguayan approaches to state-labor
relations. With respect to the Argentine case, it is worth noting that much
of the substantive move towards the consolidation of democracy occurs after
the procedural conquest of political power was achieved. The abrupt collapse
of the "Proceso" and the outpouring of public sentiment in favor of a
democratic transition left little time for the full establishment of
democratic institutions prior to the formal transfer of government authority
(beyond the resurrection of political parties and a general relaxation of
restrictions governing rights of opinion and association).' Per ende , the
primary task of the Alfonsin government is to promote the substantive
institutional bases required for democratic consolidation. The central ity of
this "institutionalizing" phase stems from the following.
Top down or bottom up, a central step towards full democracy involves the
institutionalization of democratic regimes. The creation of democratic
structures, as we have seen, is evident at the levels of both state and civil
society. This is most obviously seen in the procedural neutrality granted the
state apparatus, and in the legal eauality granted political parties and the
collective agents of differently endowed social groups when addressing their
specific demands and ongoing interests before other groups and the state. It
is this institutional foundation upon which are built the structural bases of
democratic class compromise in capitalist societies. However, in countries
where the democratic rules of the game are well entrenched, or in which the
class lines are unclearly drawn or overlapped, the terms of the compromise may
be more implicit, rather than explicit. Consecrated in popular folklore and
political myth, the strength and longevity of the class compromise may
eventually allcv.' it to recede in the public memory, as well as permit the
elevation of general elections to the status of political ritual [witness the
United States, Canada, and France]. This stems from a generalized consensus
that regardless of the specific outcome of an election (which is merely a
procedure that guarantees regularized, institutional uncertainty), democratic
values and rules will continue to be upheld throughout society.
In capitalist countries lacking in democratic culture or in which class
lines are clearly demarcated, the terms of democratic class compromise may of
necessity be made quite explicit, and are codified in a series of laws and
other institutional measures enforced by the legally autonomous state (such as
in Portugal, Spain, and Greece). The fluid nature of economic and social
factors in turn forces regular re-negotiation of the terms. This requires a
specific organization of the state so that it provides an institutional forum
in which the structural bases of class compromise can be adjusted via regular
re-negotiation. The recent authoritarian experiments and clear drawing of
class lines experienced by the newly democratic nations of the Southern Cone
therefore make it highly probable that it will be this type of framework that
will be employed during each "institutionalizing" phase.
We shall now proceed to discuss in further detail the notion of
democratic class compromise as requiring structural bases for its
reproduction. For the moment dwell on the fact that, whatever its initial
phase, the full achievement of democracy requires substantive change at the
institutional level, since it is at this level where the political guarantees
underlieing societal and economic democracy are formulated and enforced.
Phrased differently, establishing the structural bases of class compromise
constitutes the institutional means by which the move towards a full
achievement of substantive democracy is guaranteed.
III. Class Compromise and the State
To specify further, the democratic state acts as an institutional
mediator and provides the organizational framework in which the structural
bases of class compromise are negotiated and formally agreed upon. The core
of the compromise, as Przeworski and Wallerstein have shown, rests on
establishing a mutually acceptable -- and hence preferred, if not optimal
-- rate of (re) investment out of profit. Maintained at a rate that guarantees
yearly increases in productivity, such on agreement ensures that the material
standards of living of both workers and employers increase over time.^ In
order to guarantee this preferred rate of (re) investment, regardless of
short-term fluctuations in profit, the democratic state offers a series of
legal and material inducements and constraints that are designed to ensure
compliance on both sides.
*
On the one hand, these include measures such as the rate of interest, tax
on profits, investment tax credits, depreciation allowances, differential
taxation of capital gains, lower import and export duties for raw materials
and finished goods respectively, surcharges, fines, plus other incentives and
disincentives that help spur employer's interest in establishing and upholding
the terms of the compromise. Similarly, state-provided public goods and
services such as cost of living allowances, social security and other welfare
benefits, low-interest mortgage rates and/or public housing, ceilings on
public transportation rates, medical and other forms of guaranteed leave
programs, guarantees on jobs security, pension plans, etc., and more
generally, certain basic rights of association and monopoly of representation
awarded their collective representatives, do the same for workers. In broad
terms, this institutional network includes agencies of the state (in
consultation with representatives of capital and labor) charged with
formulating and implementing "policies relating to wages, industrial
relations, labor disputes, social security, promotion of equal rights,
occupational safety and health, protection of migrant workers, conditions of
work, participation in the process of economic and social planning, inflation,
vocational training, productivity, and protection of the environment." 10
The provision of social security benefits has been one area in Latin
America where the impact of regime type and individual regime approaches
towards organized labor has been particularly evident, and as such constitutes
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a major institutional conditioner of the possibilities of class compromise
in the new democracies of the Southern Cone. As Malloy and Rosenberg point
out,
"direct citizen participation has never been an issue
or real possibility in the area of social security policy
in Latin America. The issue has been one of 'representa-
tion' of 'classes' or 'groups' of interests, defined
vocationally, before the state by organizations officially
enpowered (by recognition) to articulate such interests.
. . . Coverage as a rule was not extended to citizens as
such or to broad classes of citizens; rather, wage and
salary earners were divided (fragmented) into discrete
occupational groupings for purposes of social security
coverage . . . Social security coverage in general evolved
on a piecemeal, group-by-group basis ... By and large,
the quality of coverage was positively correlated with the
sequence of coverage. Both the sequence and quality of
coverage were determined by the power of groups to pose a
threat to the existing sociopolitical systems and the
administrative logic of the contractual type of social
insurance schemes developed within the region . . . The
upshot was the incremental evolution of social security
systems that were both highly fragmented and unequally
stratified in terms of the quality of programs . . . These
structures, which were often part of a general corporatist
approach to labor relations, reflected the goal of
established elites to undercut the emergence of a broad
class-conscious movement of workers. "H
In many instances, the extension of social security coverage was part of the
initial period of union incorporation into the national political "game" (a
subject we shall return to later), and involved union control over state and
employer-financed medical and pension programs, such as the "Obras Social es"
in postwar Argentina. For this reason, institutional approaches towards
social security coverage for organized labor will play a large role in
determining whether a democratic class compromise can be achieved there.
Specifically, the policies and organizational strategies adopted by the
Argentine state in the area of social security coverage for organized labor
now comprise a major part of the broader institutional framework within which
the structural bases of a democratic class compromise are to be established.
11
Another essential, yet very different component of this broader
institutional framework is public employment policy and programs, which in
Argentina have often been used to absorb surplus labor, or to reward or punish
the labor movement (depending on whether it was being used as an inducement or
constraint). Given that the public sector is the largest source of employment
in Argentina, coupled with the high level of unionization in the public sector
(which dates back to the partially incorporative efforts of the Yrigoyen
regime during the teens, and which received its largest boost during the first
Peronist regime), and given the new regime's commitment to the "privatization"
of public enterprises and "rationalization" of public administration (both
encouraged by IMF enforced debt refinancing agreements), it is clear that
public employment policy will be an integral element of any Argentine attempt
at class compromise, and hence of the current process of democratic
consolidation.
With the democratic state offering a judicious mixture of inducements and
constraints, and often acting as a mediator in negotiations over more
narrowly-focused wage versus investment questions, employers and workers are
free to negotiate on a yearly basis the optimal rate of (re) investment that
will promote the productivity increases that ensure that both wages and
profits continue to rise. In this fashion both sides have, on the basis of
rational calculations of self-interest, reason to abide by the terms of the
compromise.
The essence of the democratic class compromise envisioned here therefor
operates as follows: through their collective representatives, capitalists
(employers) agree to the establishment of democratic institutions through
which workers, represented by their respective collective agents, press claims
for material gains in exchange for their acceptance of the institution of
profit, following the logic that capital accumulation leads to the expansion
12
of production. It is these democratic institutions—and particularly the
democratic state—that serve as arbiters and mediators of the compromise.
IV. The Political Economy of Democratic Class Relations
Accepting the notion that profit is essential for the capital
accumulation required to reproduce the national mode of production, workers
consent to the perpetuation of profit in exchange for improvements in their
material welfare. That is, they formally agree that the material condition of
all groups is derived from profit, and that future wages therefore depend on
current profits, or more precisely, the rate of ( re) investment out of profit.
Since investment occurs out of profit, reinvestment is essential for
capitalist reproduction and the attendant improvements in material conditions
of all socio-economic groups linked to it. Wages are conseauently tied to
productivity, since this produces the profit from which (re) investment is
derived. From the worker's perspective, current profits are a form of
worker- delegated investment, since the worker is the ultimate producer (i.e.
as wage labor translated into the value of the product and the surplus value
in profit).
In effect, a democratic class compromise must include a central feature
of the process of production, namely the rate of investment out of profit (or
high rate of saving), with the relation of wages to profits based on a fixed
rate of investment out of profit. In fact, any agreement on merely turning
profits into wages is tenuous from the worker's standpoint because it does not
guarantee a steady rate of saving and (re) investment conducive to improvements
in long term productivity (and hence material standards of living). As a
result, investment decisions cannot be left solely to capitalists (employers).
The working classes need an equal voice in such decisions, and the democratic
13
state must provide the framework for that process to occur. 12 This leads to a
specific organization of the state as an expression and agent of reproduction
of a democratic class compromise between workers and capitalists (with each
group represented by their respective collective agents).
Democratic class compromise reflects the convergence of second-best
choices available to capitalists and workers. Capitalists forgo
super-exploitation and political authoritarianism; workers forgo economic and
political militancy which threaten the capitalist parameters of society.
Institutionalized uncertainty in the form of regular elections and other
procedural measures guarantee competitive access to governmental authority.
In the economic sphere, a series of institutional arrangements similarly
provide a framework in which the convergence of second-best choices occurs on
materially-calculated grounds of self-interest. The risks inherent in
adopting best choice strategies encourage the mutual adoption of second-best
options. The risks involved in adopting second-best strategies force regular
renegotiation of the terms of the compromise at both the economic and
political levels. This is, in effect, a compromised process of competition
based on contingent consent. 13
Hence, the organization and function of specific branches of the
democractic state reflect an institutional effort to diminish the uncertainty
of both workers and capitalists that the compromise will hold. That is, ". .
institutional arrangements are crucial to determine the actual level of risk
involved. Corporatist arrangements are designed specifically to increase
certainty beyond the particular collective agreement or a particular election:
they constitute a form of self-commitment of the parties to adhere to some
agreed compromise independently of the short-term fluctuations of both
economic conditions and of popular will as expressed in elections." 14 It
14
should be noted that the type of corporatist arrangements alluded to would
have to be inclusionary and societal in nature, since exclusionary and/or
strictly state corporatist arrangements would not be reflective of a genuine
democratic compromise between socio-economic groups differently related to the
means of production. The basic point remains that there must be an
institutional arrangement at the level of the state that provides the forum in
which the structural bases of democratic class compromise are worked out. In
other words, the democratic state provides organizational and legal boundaries
in which the collective representatives of workers and capitalists can
rationally calculate on the basis of belf-interest the (mutual) advantages
accrued to them by such an agreement, and then negotiate the precise terms
(i.e. structural bases) that constitute the formal parameters of class
compromise. Hence, class compromise is the product of tripartite negotiation,
a formal type of strategic interaction between labor, capital, and the state
based on notions of equitable exchange. Reaffirmed over time (via yearly
renegotiation of the terms), this arrangement eventually will be reflected in
mutual expectations of workers and capitalists that the structural bases of
class compromise can--and will—be maintained.
If the compromise holds, it is possible to spur broad-based increases in
productivity by treating wages as a consumption variable (that is, as an
output translated into purchasing power), rather than an input factor cost
(overhead) that must be kept low. This could help overcome situations where
income differences are exacerbated by a lack of increases in domestic
consumption. In any event, there exist three sets of risks confronting both
workers and capitalists: 1) a lack of class unity on either side, which makes
it impossible for them to have a monopoly of representation, i.e., for one or
both to have a single legitimate bargaining agent (or set of agents). This is
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more likely the case with employers competing within (and even between)
various economic sectors but is quite possible among workers in different
sectors as well (e.g. between those employed in foreign-owned versus
domestically-owned firms); 2) the use of the state for partisan purposes that
infringe on its autonomy and favor one side to the detriment of the other; and
3) larger systemic economic risks normally associated with capitalism, in this
case aggravated by a large foreign debt burden, a yery high rate of inflation,
and a low rate of investment.^
The importance of class compromise in the process of re-democratization
and democratic consolidation has been well reflected in the recent experiences
of a number of Southern European nations (as well as several of their North
European counterparts). According to P. C. Schmitter, "particularly
important in the contemporary consolidation process are the efforts undertaken
to reach and implement 'socio-economic pacts' as a device to reduce
uncertainties and expectations in specific policy areas such as wages, prices,
investments, and taxation. "* 6 Such pacts are by no means the exclusive
province of Europe. In 1973 the democratically-elected r»gimp headed by Juan
D. Peron attempted to establish such a pact in Argentina through its
"Pacto Social ".I? More recently, the Alfonsin administration has attempted to
take concrete steps in a similar direction by calling together business,
government, and labor representatives in the newly created Economic and Social
Conference (Conferencia Economico y Social) in order to discuss wage policy,
only to have labor representatives walk out a short time later (after the
government announced a wage readjustment without prior consultation).^
Similary, before the procedual advent of democracy in Brazil in 1985, there
was much discussion of such a pact. However, a lack of class unity on either
side, coupled with the restrictive labor legislation of the outgoing regime,
16
precluded the reaching of an agreement. In a year that so far has seen 326
strikes, it is now a central concern of the Sarnay government.
In other Latin American countries, socio-economic pacts are viewed as
stabilizing mechanisms. In Venezuela, "from 1960 on, one can speak of a tacit
agreement among parties, worker organizations, and industrialists to maintain
in the country what has come to be called the 'labor peace,' which has been
solidified increasingly through concertacion (reaching informal agreements so
as to avoid public conflict). Without a doubt this constitutes a basic factor
in the stability of the present regime. "^ Finally, such pacts are often an
integral part of the process of (re) democratization itself. For example, the
"Concertacion Nacional Programatica" represented an effort on the part of a
wide range of opposition groups to reach agreement on the structural
conditions necessary for a democratic transition and consolidation in Uruguay,
which then allowed them to confront the outgoing military regime on common
terms. 20
In countries emerging from authoritarian rule, the terms of the
concertacion are often necessarily made formally rather than informally, as
they deliniate and codify the non-zero sum rules that are the bases of
substantive democracy. This was evident in the political and economic pacts
negotiated in Southern Europe during the earlier wave of re-democratization
that swept through it in the seventies. Ongoing maintenance of such pacts,
via regular renegotiation of the terms, allows a high level of mutual
expectation and trust to develop among the "social partners." It is possible
that the equitable political balance generated by this type of arrangement,
when maintained over time, may well allow for a high level of regime stability
based on informal agreements. The more important point is that, whether they
17
be formal or informal, such pacts are agreed upon by sectoral interests
represented by their respective collective agents within an institutional
framework outlined by the state. The organization of this institutional
network, i.e., state apparatus and organized sectoral interests, constitutes
the structural bridge between procedural and substantive democracy. 21
More pertinent to our focus here, the terms of the compromise are worked
out within the institutional framework of the state itself, most often under
the aegis of a Labor Ministry and its specialized agencies (here referred to
as a national labor administration). As I have argued elsewhere, the very
structure and function of these institutional forums varies significantly
according to the type of regime in power, since it is political regimes that
control the apex of the state apparatus, or what is commonly known as
government. 22 As such, the institutional framework erected within the
democratic state in order to foster the achievement of democratic class
compromise between capitalists and workers exhibits certain organizational
traits not shared by states that are controlled by other types of regime.
According to Przeworski and Wallerstein, "(c)lass compromise implies a
particular organization of political relations, a particular relation between
each class and the state, a particular set of institutions, and a particular
set of policies. The state must enforce the compliance of both classes with
the terms of each compromise and protect those segments of each class that
enter into a compromise from non-cooperative behavior of their fellow class
members." In other words, "the organization of the state as an institution
and the policies pursued by this institution constitute an expression of a
specific class compromise. "23 it is therefore an autonomous and
interventionist state, with a specific set of features that are conducive to
the establishment of the structural bases of democratic class compromise. 24
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It is undoubtably true that under democratic regimes most of the state
apparatus (or at least those branches with domestic responsibilities) serves
as a vehicle for maintaining class compromise, just as a large part of the
state apparatus often serves as an instrument for class domination under
authoritarian regimes. Moreover, while the particulars of the state's role in
promoting and maintaining the compromise may vary significantly among
different types of stable democratic regimes (for example, between federal,
unitarian, consociational , and parliamentary systems), it is nonetheless
likely to be crucial in countries in which democracy has been absent for long
periods of time, as is the case here. With this in mind, we should focus
attention on the branch of the state that plays a leading institutional role
in the labor relations system. The reasons for this are as follows.
Lacking in individual resources when compared with propertied elements in
society, subordinate socioeconomic groups in capitalist societies are heavily
reliant upon their collective agents for the defense and representation of
their common interests. This is because "it is the ability to organize which
largely governs the degree of participation in the decision-making process,
which in turn facilitates the access of most of the underprivil edged groups to
the goods and services that are available to the community. "25 in fact, it is
only through collective action (organized or not) that subordinate groups
influence the policy-making process. However, while spontaneous, unorganized
collective action such as demonstrations may have excellent dramatic impact at
a specific moment, it is clear that the long-term, coherent, and systematic
representation and defense of subordinate group interests requires an
organized collective agent capable of negotiating -- rationally or
"irrationally," as the case be -- with the collective agents of propertied
groups and different agencies of the state.
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Hence, at a general level, the organized labor movement represents the
collective means by which the working classes address their common concerns,
defend their general interests, and present their specific demands before
employers and the political authorities that control the state. As such,
organized labor occupies a leadership position when it comes to expressing the
economic and political desires of the working classes in general. That is,
more than a "labor aristocracy ," organized labor is the most politically and
economically articulate sector of the working classes, hence its leadership
role. In the words of a former Argentine labor leader, "syndicalism must
fulfill a double function that promotes the advancement of the working class
and the people in general . . . (that is) it is charged with revindicating the
economic, political, social, and cultural rights of workers and, from its
specific position, simultaneously marshal Is energies to ensure that political
power is exercized by the people. "26
Of course, the logic of collective action extends to other social groups
as well, particularly during processes of re-democratization and democratic
consolidation. This is because ". . consolidation involves a public
definition of substantive issues and an institutional specification of policy
spaces which brings organized interests to the forefront." 27 Hence the
importance of "peak associations" that segmental ly divide civil society along
functional, ethnic, religious, or class lines (one of the latter being
National Labor Confederations). 28 It is the peak associations of capitalists
and workers who ultimately negotiate, often with state mediation, the terms
of the class compromise.
The importance of such "tripartism" has long been recognized in the labor
relations field.
"Tripartite co-operation began its development in what are called
the three basic areas of minimum wage fixing, the settlement of
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labour disputes and the administration of social insurance.
Starting with these areas, tripartism expanded to other sectors of
labour policy such as employment and human resources, vocational
training, occupational safety and health, industrial relations and
the protection of certain specific types of work. Recently the need
has been felt to associate representatives of employer' and workers'
organizations in certain labour administration programmes designed
to improve working conditions and the working environment. "29
In Latin America, belief in tripartism lies behind the use of socio-economic
pacts and concertacion as stabilizing mechanisms in democratic regimes.
Hence,
"(b)y its yery nature, labour administration makes an
obvious meeting point for workers, employers, and
representatives of their organizations who wish to discuss
and settle their problems. The parties themselves have
always displayed an interest in strengthening their direct
contacts and their links with the labour authorities.
Experience has indeed shown that when neither side had the
opportunity to know the point of view of the other or to
make known its own point of view, or when no use was made
of the intermediary function of labour ministries, or when
it was not possible to influence the manner in which they
ran public affairs, the activities of both trade unions
and employers were inevitably restricted and precarious.
The development of tripartite cooperation was resisted
only by the most uncompromising trade unionists and the
most obdurate employers who sometimes refused to recognize
the exi stance of the other party. Otherwise the tendency
both in the trade unions and on the part of professional
management as it evolved in the region was to accept and
promote tripartism. In this way, the initial somewhat
sporadic contacts dating back to the establishment of
labour ministries, gradually gave way to more
institutionalized forms of reapprochment and even to
systems of collaboration. "30
In any case, be it cooperative or conflictive, it is clear that the
importance of using collective action to achieve common goals is a mainstay of
political life, and as such is a fact not lost on organized labor when
confronting political authorities (represented by the state) and capitalists
under a variety of regime types. However, the ability of organized labor
— as with any large, diverse, and nationally aggregated social group -- to
speak uniformly with one voice is often difficult to achieve, especially in
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political climates where such unity is officially discouraged. This is all
the more onerous when contending social groups do enjoy such cohesiveness, or
where they enjoy the protection of the regime in power. Thus the current
dilemma confronting the Peronist labor movement, which although
organizationally united through the "vertical" union structure, is torn by
internecine ideological disputes between various factions (especially the
so-called "62" organizations -- itself cleaved into "Miguel ista" and
"Ubaldinista" camps -- and the 25 unions of the "renovating" current) about
the true content of Peronism. In addition, the Peronist Party is similarly
divided while simultaneously engaged in an institutional competition with the
Peronist-dominated General Labor Confederation (Confederacion General de
Trabajo, or CGT) for the "hearts and minds" of the Peronist masses. Since the
disarticulation of organized labor at the national level was a primary
objective of the preceeding authoritarian regime, and since Argentine
capitalists have nationally representative peak associations speaking for them
(such as the Sociedad Rural, Camara de Exportadores, Union Industrial, and
various foreign chamber of commerce groups), it should be apparent that the
achievement of an organizational ability to speak with one voice through its
peak associations remains a fundamental (short-term) task for organized labor
during the process of democratic consolidation.
In fact, consolidation of the labor movement also is a primary concern of
the new democratic authorities, who recognize the importance of organized
labor in the overall process of democratic consolidation, and who are
consequently anxious to see that the status of the labor movement be
"normalized" (to use the term employed in Argentina). Thus, "(w)ithin what
the President . . and other members of government frequently call the
modernization of the State and of fundamental public activities, figures the
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re-structuring of labor relations which, according to official reasoning,
implies legal reforms not only applicable to syndical organizations as such,
but also to their participation in the economic and social system. "31 To that
effect, "Legislative projects have been and are being elaborated which
regulate the constitutional right to strike, new collective bargaining
agreements, and other guarantees of health insurance, as well as apply
dispositions which determine the role of public authorities in this new
relationship. Possibly the most important legal initiative is the future Law
of Professional Associations . . . which if accomplished, will produce a
profound transformation in labor structures and rel ations. "32
Governmental preoccupation with including organized labor in the
democratic consolidation process also is due to the belief that it offers
benefits in the form of reciprocal legitimation. That is,
"it would seem that the establishment of a political
democracy under conditions of contemporary capitalism where
the state has a substantial responsibility for intervening
in the economy and society -- and is held accountable for
its performance in doing so by the electorate -- reauires,
in addition to the competitive interaction of
political parties
,
some effort at establishing a system of
regularized bargaining between social parties
,
usually
nationally aggregated, comprehensive class associations,
which will help to control certain economic parameters and
to ensure a higher level of social peace. . . In the more
uncertain conditions of an on-going consolidation of
democracy, their contribution may even be more important.
For, in addition to their potential role in controlling
economic parameters, pacts of this sort may play a crucial
'legitimizing' role. The associations require public
recognition of their status as privil edged (if not
necessarily monopolistic) intermediaries; the new regime
needs to prove to the public that it is capable of
producing a class compromise and generating social peace.
This potentiality for "reciprocal legitimation" is,
however, no assurance that the "social partners"
-- business, labor, and the state -- will find it easier to
reach agreements and, especially, to implement them. To a
considerable extent, this will depend on the organizational
structure and resources of the peak interest associations
which emerge from the transition process. .".33
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In fact, in democratic systems the benefits of reciprocal interaction
goes beyond mutual legitimation. That is, reciprocal interaction between
collective representatives of voluntary associations and formal political
institutions such as political parties not only provides checks and balances
on the democratic state and a measure of legitimacy, it also "enriches the
institutional landscape of politics, supplementing the role of political
parties in articulating interests, stimulating participation, increasing
citizen efficacy and effectiveness, recruiting leaders, and enhancing
commitment to the democratic system. "34 This is often reflected at an
organizational level on both sides. In Venezuela, for example, "the
operational norms of most associations are modeled on those common in the
political system. Competitive elections are standard practice, the rights of
opposition are generally respected, and opposition representatives commonly
share in group governance through proportional representation. In all these
ways, organizational life reflects and reinforces more general political
principles. "35 It is ostensibly this goal which fuels the current attempt by
the Alfonsin government to revise the Law of Professional Associations, the
basic legal charter regulating the structure and behavior of labor unions and
federations. In the eyes of the Peronist leaders of the union movement,
it is a desire to destroy the institutional foundations of Peronism which
fuels the proposed revisions of the union charter, and they have so far
successfully opposed it (the first attempt to revise the Law of Professional
Associations was defeated in Congress in February, 1984, and was Alfonsin' s
first major political defeat). In any event, reciprocal interaction and
legitimation ultimately derive from a shared belief in the benefits of
equitable social exchange. Specifically, the "social partners" accept the
mutual benefits accrued through this type of strategic interaction -- the
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right to private property and profit for capital, social peace, economic
growth, and political legitimacy for the state, and a more equitable and
participatory role for organized labor in the economic and political process
(translated into a higher and more eqalitarian quality of life for the working
classes) .
Thus, if we accept the argument that class compromise is required for the
maintenance of democratic regimes, some institutional forum must exist in
which organized labor is able to formally and equitably counterpose its
position against those of competing social groups. This is especially true
for countries like Argentina, where sustained industrial growth since the
1930s, although varying in extent, specific character, sector, and over-all
success, fostered the rise of organized labor as a major political and
economic actor. In fact, the rapid growth and political mobilization of
organized labor is believed to have played a major role in bringing to power
both of the military-bureaucratic regimes that Argentina has experienced
during the last twenty years. That is because the growth and mobilization of
the organized working class as of 1943 was long perceived by the military
hierarchy and dominant fractions of the bourgeoisie as posing a serious threat
to the conservative, capitalist parameters of Argentine society, which has
repeatedly required authoritarian moves to forestall such a possibility. It
is now well known that the latest reaction had an extremely adverse impact on
the economic, political, physical, and spiritual fortunes of the Argentine
working class. What is important for us to consider is that the ultimate
success of the current process of redemocratization absolutely requires the
re-incorporation of organized labor as a primary political and economic actor,
and that it be on on equal footing with other socio-economic groups when
addressing its collective interests before the democratic state.
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The notion of incorporation has recently received serious attention in
regards to both the Latin American and Western European experiences. Broadly
understood as the period in which the labor movement is initially given a
participatory role as a national political and economic actor, incorporation
is believed to be a process that leaves a lasting—and often distinctive --
structural legacy in the countries in which it has occured.36 In Latin
America the original period of incorporation occurred under a variety of
political regimes, and was formalized through legal recognition, the
institution of state-mediated collective bargaining, the creation or elevation
of labor departments to cabinet-level status, and the extension of (often
union-managed and state-financed) social welfare programs. This generally
occurred between the 1930' s and 1950' s (where it did occur). 37 However, in
the Southern Cone, most recent regime approaches towards labor have been
uniformly exclusionary at both the political and economic levels. Even so,
the specific "historic memory" and characteristics of each labor movement, the
respective particulars of the original incorporation periods experienced by
each, and the extent of the exclusion to which they were subjected under the
preceeding military regimes, all have a distinctive impact on the particulars
of each process of re-incorporation. 38 Needless to say, all of this has given
a unique flavor to the Argentine case.
More generally, it is argued that the mode of incorporation of social
groups and political actors varies according to regime type, and depends on
systemic conditioners at play during specific phases of national economic and
political development. 39 for example, the initial process of incorporation
experienced by Argentine labor from 1943 to 1955 -- a populist authoritarian
mode of incorporation characterized by a high degree of personal ism and the
vertical representation of organized interests in an inclusionary state
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corporate st framework -- can not be replicated now (if this indeed was the
intention) due to a variety of economic, historical, political, and
sociological (not to mention normative) reasons. The democratic mode of
incorporation is considered to be significantly different from the populist
variant, to say nothing of military-bureaucratic attempts at exclusion.
"It is, of course, only the integrative mode of inclusion that,
other things being equal, can on a long-term irreversible basis
accommodate the massive entrance of new participants into the
political game without reinforcing any tendencies towards a
breakdown of the parliamentary institutions and the imposition
of dictatorial solutions. It is only within an integrative
system that the new entrants, given the horizontal, nonpersona-
listic mechanisms of inclusion, will reinforce the strength and
autonomy of existing collective organisations. Only then can the
distribution of political power, on the level of collective
action, be organised in such a way that extreme polarisation
between rulers and ruled is avoided and civil society is
strengthened by becoming more resilient to state manipulation
-- and this type of strengthening, as the English model of
political development has shown, presents no threat to the
bourgeois order but, on the contrary, further legitimises it by
making it more hegemonic. "40
The question of hegemony aside, it should be clear that the democratic
mode of incorporation has an integrative orientation that is manifested in a
series of structural arrangements evident in the organization of social group
interests, and in the organization of branches of the state responsible for
administering them. The question of the relative autonomy of civil society
under democratic regimes is more difficult to answer, as it transcends purely
structural transformations. Moreover, it ignores the issue of the relative
autonomy of the democratic state vis-a-vis civil society, which is also
believed to increase relative to authoritarian capitalist regimes. Ideally
then, it should be the autonomous collective agents of various social groups,
in an institutional forum provided and mediated by the equally autonomous
democratic state, who would negotiate (on rationally calculated grounds of
material self-interest) the terms of the democratic class compromise. In
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practice, this promotes a bureaucratic dynamic within both the state and
collective agents that is disposed towards structural arrangements that
utilize them in pursuit — however so elusive -- of a negotiated compromise
(i.e. a socio-economic "pact"). That is to say, relative autonomy aside, the
various social "partners," both public and private, have strong reasons to
seek to perpetuate the democratic class compromise, as it reinforces their
(organizational) positions as major economic and political actors.
As a result, in countries such as this where the working classes are
relatively large and/or well-organized, and in which they were systemically
excluded from the political arena by the previous authoritarian regime, the
promotion of class compromise requires that the new democratic regime award
importance to the specific demands and ongoing interests of organized labor,
and that it consequently provide some form of institutional framework in
which these demands and interests can be voiced, juxtaposed and weighed
against those of employers and other economic actors, and ultimately
negotiated to a peaceful resolution. This institutional framework, in other
words, becomes the primary forum in which the structural bases for democratic
class compromise are achieved.
Taking into account the size, recent history, and important postwar
political role played by Argentine labor, coupled with its important position
in the initial process of re-democratization, it seems reasonable to infer
that the branch of the Argentine state that has traditionally been responsible
for labor relations be used as the primary institutional forum for promoting
democratic class compromise, and will therefore be awarded high priority by
the Alfonsin government. This may well entail major reorganization of the
pre-existing institutional framework and labor relations system, since they
were designed and used by the preceeding regime as instruments of political
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domination and economic exclusion that subsumed working class concerns to
those of competing economic and political interests. 41
The importance of these organizational changes cannot be over-emphasized,
as they represent changes in the institutional parameters and "policy spaces"
that condition the early range of choice available to organized labor when
juxtaposing its interests against those of competing groups. These early
choices influence the subsequent evolution of political and economic
competition, and "are likely to have a lasting effect on the resources and
internal organization of interest associations -- which in turn will
predispose them to a particular role in different types of democracy ."42 it
is therefore possible to conceive of the process of regime installation and
maintenance as involving a specific mode of incorporation based on a
particular range of choice presented to key social actors (in this case
organized labor). Phrased differently, a select range of choice among
economic and political options is presented by a regime (in the form of who it
goes after and what it offers), using the state as the instrument of
application, in order to encourage the participation of important social
actors in maintaining the regime. In Gramscian terms, this range of choice
can be considered to be the essence of the hegemonic project of different
types of regime. Differences in the framing of these choices, as well as the
specific options offered, are what allow us to distinguish between the
projects proposed by each regime. In turn, the degree of cohesiveness,
organizational capacity, and resource endowment of various social actors
influence their perceptions of choice when considering the projects of
different regimes, and is what ultimately prompts them to support some and not
others.
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For these reasons, the successive, closely linked processes of democratic
incorporation and consolidation ultimately rest on a network of institutional
conditioners. That is, organizational frameworks and rules constitute the
institutional parameters that determine what forms of collective action are
feasible for different social groups and political actors (both public and
private). This conditions the range of choice available to each actor, which
in turn defines the nature and content of the strategic interaction between
them. This variable range of choice, translated into different types of
strategic interaction between collective agents, political parties, and
branches of the state, determines t*ie range of possible outcomes, only some of
which are conducive to the class compromise required for democractic
consolidation (and with many in fact working against it). It goes without
saying that the entire process is a highly dynamic, if not dialectic
continuum, and is eminently susceptible to reversal, interruption, or
collapse. The basic point is that at every level -- institutional
conditioners, forms of collective action, ranges of choice, types of strategic
interaction, and possible outcomes -- the combined process of democratic
incorportion and consolidation exhibits specific characteristics not shared by
other regime types.
Democratic incorporation therefore requires that the early range of
choice presented to labor be perceived by labor to be acceptable, if not equal
to that of other social actors, particularly capital. The institutional
framework provided by the democratic state provides the concrete guarantees
that such is the case, and is what allows labor and capital to negotiate as
equals the terms of the democratic class compromise. In turn, it is this
relatively equal range of choice, and the procedural neutrality of the state
when enforcing the terms of choice once they are accepted, that distinguishes
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the project of democratic regimes from those of other regime types. That is,
through the specific range of choice provided by state-provided and enforced
inducements and constraints, capital and labor are incorporated on equal terms
as fundamental social pillars of democratic regimes. Even so, and despite the
important issues this raises, there are currently no studies that examine the
role, structure, and functions of national labor administration in the
processes of re-democratization that have occurred in the Southern Cone.
This gap is particularly notable in light of the relative paucity and
general orientation of the literature on labor administration and labor
relations in South America. Apart from the works of Victor Alba, Robert
Alexander, Davis and Goodman, Julio Godio, Hobart Spaulding, and Howard
Wiarda, little has been written during the past twenty five years that
comparatively examines the role and structure of national labor administration
in Latin America. 43 Moreover, most of these studies, as w^ll as earlier works
such as those by Poblete Troncoso, are more exercises in descriptive history
rather than analytical examinations of Latin American labor relations
systems.
As for the remaining literature, most recent studies of organized labor
in Latin America have concentrated on the corporatist character of individual
national labor relations systems, and have sel domed ventured to undertake
cross-national comparisons. 44 Though they identify differences among the
types of corporatist approach employed (state or societal, inclusionary or
exclusionary), these works have seldom addressed the position of national
labor administration in democracies. Whatever its precise configuration,
corporatism has largely been associated in Latin America with authoritarian
rather than democratic rule, this despite recent European studies that suggest
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democracies exhibit certain corporatist traits as well. 4 ^ In fact, it has
been suggested that (democratic) corporatist arrangements may simultaneously
increase the certainty of both classes that a class compromise will hold, and
hence will yield significantly superior outcomes. 46 While the authoritarian
bias of most of the Latin American corporatist literature may well be a
reflection of the times (since at one point in the mid-seventies, when the
literature on corporatism was in full bloom, every country in the Southern
Cone plus Bolivia, Paraguay, and Peru were governed by authoritarian regimes
of one type or another), it seems less certain that this applies to the
institutional framewo k. promoted by the new democratic regimes of the
eighties. As a result, at this unique juncture in Argentine political history
of there exists no work that examines the differences between national labor
administration under the new and old regimes, much less the vital role played
by national labor administration in promoting the class compromise requisite
for democratic success over time.
But why, one might ask, should we focus on labor administration as
opposed to, say, other branches of the state involved in the economic
policy-making process? Mainly, because labor administration is a primary
institutional arena in which economic theory runs squarely into the realities
of policy implementation in a heterogenous society divided along socioeconomic
class lines. That is because agencies such as ministries of Economy are
generally responsible for formulating economic "grand strategy," i.e., the
broad parameters and long-term orientation of a regime's particular economic
project. Other agencies of this sort (such as ministries or secretariats of
Agriculture, Finance, Industry, Commerce, and Trade), each with a more
specific specialization in some aspect of that project, segmentally translate
and implement elements of the "grand strategy" in their respective areas (at
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the tactical level, as it were). At most, they receive the segmental feedback
of various propertied groups, each with a specific economic interest. However,
they do not translate said project into labor policy and thus do not directly
receive the feedback generated by the organized representatives of the labor
movement, who represent the work force in public and private enterprises which
span a wide range of economic activity. This is the province of labor
administration, which traditionally contains the organizational and legal
framework in which regime economic projects contend with the economic and
political projects and strategies of the working classes. It has also
generated a bureaucratic dynamic that seeks to perpetuate the important role
played by labor administration, and which is intrinsically amenable to
tripartism. In some parts of Latin America, for example,
"On the side of labour administration there was also (a)
marked interest in promoting the participation of the
social partners in the elaboration and application of
labour policies. It was fully realized that without the
support of the organizations directly concerned it would
not be possible to implement government policy. How could
labour standards be effectively applied, or substantial
employment promotion measures be taken, or vocational
training be really fostered without the co-operation of the
unions and employers who would be the first to be affected
by these policies? Tripartism, moreover, served a double
purpose: firstly, discussions between the parties and the
labour authorities made it possible to reach the minimum
degree of social consensus required for production
activities to be carried out normally; secondly,
tripartite co-operation provided labour ministries with
the opportunity of joining forces with organizations of
employers and of workers so as to strengthen their own
position vis-a-vis government bodies and the community as a
whole and thereby accentuate their role in the process of
economic and social development. 47
It should be obvious that there has been considerable variation in the
degree to which national labor administration in different countries has been
able to achieve either this ostensible objective or the degree of autonomy
that it reguires. Not surprisingly, best success has been achieved in stable
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democratic regimes such as that of Venezuela. Conversely, the recent
experience of labor administration in the Southern Cone has seen its position
severely curtailed as cooperative orientations gave way to the exclusionary
policies of military bureaucratic regimes. In any case, it should be equally
clear that labor administration is the primary institutional forum in which
the specifics of democratic class compromise are worked out, will thus be
awarded considerable priority by the new democratic regimes in the Southern
Cone, and should therefore be the object of more detailed analysis.
Our focus will therefore center on the two dimensions of Argentine labor
administration that together constitute what is known as tne national labor
relations system. At an external level (that is, outside the state proper),
we must identify the labor strategies adopted by the democratic regime, and
the legislation and other legal or material instruments used to implement
these strategies and regulate the activities of the organized labor movement.
As pa~t of this review, these measures must be related to those that were
employed by the previous regime-48 At an internal level (that is, within the
state apparatus), a number of variables within national labor administration
need to be examined. Grouped into three broad organizational categories
-- structure, budget, and personnel — these variables include organizational
hierarchy, jurisdiction, and internal emphasis, personnel backgrounds,
distribution, and turnover, and budgetary size (both in total amounts and as a
percentage of central administrative outlays) and internal distribution.
While the Labor Ministry (Ministerio de Trabajo y Sequridad Social) serves as
lead agency in the national labor relations system, focus on these variables
allows for more precise analysis of the role and structure of the entire
system, which can be related back to the framework used by the previous regime
in order to discern areas of continuity and change. 49
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We can then proceed to determine whether and how these external and
internal dimensions of national labor administration are combined with
employer inducements and constraints in order to provide an institutional
framework for achieving the structural bases of democratic class compromise
between the Argentine working class and other socio-economic groups. 50 The
interaction between these state strategies and those of the labor movement
will be given close scrutiny. Study of Argentine labor administration is
doubly valuable because most analyses of the Argentine policy-making process
have concentrated their attention on elite influence on policy and presence in
the state apparatus. 51 Even now, much emphasis is given to the nature of the
elites involved in formulating policy in agencies such as the Ministerio de
Economia, Secretaria de Finanzas, and Secretaria de PI aneamiento, especially
their relationship with various sectors of Argentine capital. In turn,
studies of Argentine labor consistently depict it as the restive object of a
campaign of economic and political subordination on the part of these
elites. 52 Yet, whether in opposition or as a base of support, the Argentine
labor movement represents a force which has shaped the contours of the modern
Argentine political landscape. In spite of this, conditions during the
postwar era have worked against the full, long-term incorporation of organized
labor as a social partner equal to the propertied elites. It may well have
taken the trauma of the 1970s to alert Argentines of all classes to the fact
that this is a fundamental step in the consolidation of the democratic regime
-- although that is something that remains to be seen.
IV. Regime Type and State Structure
This study arrives at an opportune moment, as it extends the thrust of
recent comparative research on the state and regimes. There is evidence to
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suggest that the role, structure, and functions of national labor
administration vary according to regime type. 53 This tends to confirm, at
least partially, more general observations about the different organizational
characteristics exhibited by the state under different types of regime (and
even among the same regime-type) .54 i n a series of path-breaking essays,
Oscar Oszlak and Guillermo O'Donnell have argued that in Latin America, the
organization of the state apparatus offers clear and concrete evidence of the
type of political regime in power. 55 As the preeminent institutional actor,
the state manifests the social, economic, political, and military objectives
of regimes, since translating policy into action requires an organizational
capacity to do so. In this regard, we can conceive of national state
organization -- that is, the role, structure, and functions of the state
apparatus, both generally and in terms of specific branches in "core" areas of
endeavor -- 56 as a reliable political indicator of the regime in power. 57 it
should be obvious that this has both theoretical and practical implications
that extend far beyond mere academic exercise.
In terms of recent Latin American experiences, Oszlak provides valuable
synoptic descriptions of the state apparatus under several different types of
regime. Bureaucratic-authoritarian (BA) regimes adopt pyramidal structural
hierarchies characterized by parallel (most often military) control
hierarchies. They undertake a program of rationalization, de-concentration,
and subsidarization of functional responsibilities, coupled with an
efficiency-based management orientation. Financially, BA regimes employ
universal i st budgetary schemes governed by authoritarian allocation
procedures. At the personnel level, there is often a virtual "colonization"
of the state by military personnel. 58
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Under liberal democratic regimes (which have been admittedly few in Latin
America), Oszl ak uncovered poliarchic (following Dahl's definition)
hierarchical structures in which control hierarchies are shaped by public
opinion, political parties, and the pressures exerted by representatives of
important social groups. Organizational autonomy (which will be elaborated
upon shortly) and de-centralization, coupled with a cliental istic orientation,
are the functional hallmarks of states controlled by these regimes, though
this often leads to the duplication of agencies and overlapping of
responsibilities. At a budgetary level, financial autarky and competitive
allocation procedures are the norm. In terms of personnel, there is a clear
move towards populating higher-echelon positions in the state apparatus with
career public servants.
Patrimonial regimes erect radial hierarchical structures with personal ist
control channels, and superimpose these on a highly formalized (when not
sclerotic) bureaucracy subordinated to ad-hoc decision-making agencies (the
so-called patrimonial "court"). Financial resources are concentrated within
the executive branch and subject to discretionary allocation criteria.
Personnel selection is highly personal istic and ascriptive in nature. 59
As alluded to earlier, recent studies suggest that these general
differences are replicated at a microanalytic level within specific branches
of the state, although the precise organizational traits in question often
vary between different "core" branches of the state as well as among regimes
(between national labor and health administration under military-bureaucratic
and populist regimes, for example). 60 These differences extend to the level
of public policy. Specifically, even when taking into account several
constraints which diminish its impact at specific points in time, Benjamin
Most has demonstrated that regime change has a significant influence on public
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policy in modern Argentina. This tends to confirm more general observations
made by Oszlak and O'Donnell. 61
To elaborate on the notion that regime type has a decided impact in the
area of labor relations policy, consider that the structure of national labor
administration (including hierarchies, formal mission and modes of
interaction) identifies the way in which public resources and policy
responsibilities are distributed within the labor relations system. A
detailed budgetary breakdown identifies salary versus non-salary allocations,
at what level financial authority is vested, and the type of financing used.
Personnel data identifies who operates the national labor relations system,
their training and social backgrounds, and their individual roles. Together,
such individual and organizational resources and strategies, informal and
formal rules, allocation and recruitment procedures, all influence the
formulation and implementation of policy within the general parameters
established by individual regimes. This emerges in the form of decrees,
edicts, laws, and resolutions enforced by the Labor Ministry and affiliated
agencies. It is therefore the nature of these internal variables, and how
they interact with the previously mentioned external variables, that gives
precise character to the current Argentine labor relations system.
The basic point should be clear. Though dissimilarly filtered into
organizational reforms, and although often promoting different traits in
different "core" areas of state activity, regime change has strong impact on
public policy and the role, structure, and functions of the national state
apparatus. This impact is particularly felt in those branches of the state
with important (when not critical) domestic responsibilities. That is, while
externally-oriented branches (the military apparatus and diplomatic services)
may have requirements that diminish the impact of regime change on their
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organizational framework (but not on their policy orientation), internally-
oriented branches connected to important domestic issues tend to be influenced
by regime change in more direct fashion. Given the legacy it has inherited,
Argentine labor administration constitutes one such "core" area of state
activity. More importantly, the position organized labor occupies in the
political and economic spectrum makes the role and organization of national
labor administration a central concern of the new democratic regime. This is
especially true when we factor in the role it potentially plays in fostering
the establishment of the structural bases of democratic class compromise
between organized labor (as the collective agents of the working classes) and
employer-producer groups (as the collective agents of capitalist interests).
To questions deserve additional mention. First, much has been said about
the "relative autonomy" of the democratic capitalist state. That is, the
state under stable democratic regimes in capitalist societies is believed to
contain relatively autonomous bureaucracies that are unbeholden to specific
class interests, and which in fact have particular institutional interests of
their own. At worst, it is believed that this merely disguises the class
domination upon which the bourgeois state is founded. At best (and more
pertinent to our concerns), this allows for a degree of institutional
neutrality and flexibility that is conducive to class compromise. 62
The notion of the relative autonomy of the democratic capitalist state is
the subject of much debate. 63 for our purposes, a refinement of the concept
is necessary. The notion of state autonomy must be split in two in order to
better reflect its different levels of operation. Hence, normative autonomy
refers to the ability of the state apparatus to formul ate policies free from
the overt interference of competing sectors of civil society (more subtle
pressures instead serving as motives for discrete change within the general
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parameters established for such policy-making). Operative autonomy refers to
the ability of the state apparatus to implement policies free from these
pressures. Together, these two levels constitute what is commonly referred to
as the procedural neutrality of the democratic capitalist state.
The basic issue is therefore one of relative "permeability." That is, how
permeable are the apex of the state, or government (at the level of normative
autonomy), and specific branches of the Argentine state (at the level of
operative autonomy), when confronted by the competing pressures exerted by
different sectors of civil society? Arguments by Skocpol and others suggest
that the degree of permeability of the democratic capitalist state is low. 64
Oszlak has argued that just the opposite is the case in Latin America (hence
the "cliental istic" orientation of the public bureaucracy), something that I
have found to be true in a study of the modern Argentine state. 65
In a related vein, O'Donnell has pointed out the apparently
(authoritarian) regime-specific segmental "capture" of certain branches of the
state by influential social groups, in a form of inclusionary societal
corporatist scheme that often "bi-frontally" parallels exclusionary state
corporatist arrangements that are designed to control, rather than administer
the interests of subordinate social groups. 66 For example, under the
"Proceso" state autonomy (at both levels) was quite low in the economic
policy-making branch, while at the same time it was quite high in the more
militarized branches (including labor administration) charged with enforcing
the exclusionary program. 67 In fact, this represents just one organizational
manifestation of the latest in a series of "tidal" institutional changes that
have swept the Argentine state apparatus after 1930, and which have responded
to "pendular" shifts in the uneasy power balance between Argentine social
groups (evident in frequent regime change). 68 More generally, this points
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to the fact that different forms of social group interest mediation and
managed political access reflect the relationship of different social groups
with different types of regimes.
Whatever our understanding of bourgeoise democratic state autonomy, a
critical point remains: the democratic capitalist state must generally serve
as a neutral arbiter and guarantor of class compromise in order for democracy
to be maintained, so it must develop at both levels a certain measure of
autonomy relative to the particular interests of different socio-economic
groups. Here Offe's notion of "state managers" becomes important, for it is
procedurally neutral, sectoral ly impartial, and class-detached professionals
within the democratic state that serve as the human referees of the
compromise. 69 i n other words, rather than the representatives of one or the
other class (although these also often tend to be incorporated into the
institutional process), experienced public servants -- in the case of national
labor administration most often specialists in labor legislation, conflict
mediation, and procedural law -- use their expertise to promote an
institutional framework in which labor and capital can negotiate the specific
terms of the democratic class compromise.
The orientation of the democratic state is therefore apparent at the
micro-organizational level. Not only is there a general trend towards
increased autonomy and procedural neutrality on the part of state agencies;
their very structure reflects the class compromise as well. For example,
there is a general compartmental ization and decentralization of functional
tasks within "core" branches of the state such as national labor
administration. On the one hand, tasks connected with registration of
collective bargaining agents and more specific negotiation/mediation duties
are separated and functionally compartmentalized within their own sub-cabinet
agencies (such as the Direccion Nacional de Relaciones de Trabajo and the
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Direccion Nacional de Asociaciones Profesionales in the Argentine Labor
Ministry). In parallel, the state increases its responsibilities in other
areas pertinent to labor concerns such as welfare legislation, - ~ial
security, employee health standards and care, work schedules, retirement and
pension plans, mandatory vacation leave, sick leave, etc. With the democratic
state assuming a larger role in these areas (and with each area often having a
cabinet or sub-cabinet agency expressly responsible for it), the collective
agents of labor can first be formally recognized, then brought together with
the collective representatives of capitalist interests in an institutional
forum where they can strictly negotiate wage versus (re) investment terms.
While it is debatable whether the limited democratic regimes of Arturo
Frondizi (1958-1962) and Arturo 1111a (1963-1966) had this as their specific
objective, they did adopt organizational approaches that were similar to each
other and yet markedly different from either the military-bureaucratic or
populist authoritarian approaches to labor relations. Resource flows within
national labor administration did in fact follow a pattern such as that
described above, with financial emphasis accorded welfare functions and
administration, while apparent neutrality and professional experience
dominated the appointment of upper-echelon personnel charged with mediation,
registration, and administrative tasks.
Obviously, there is a variation on this theme. The central point remains
that this type of structural framework is markedly different from the more
centralized and/or narrowly defined structures evidenced by national labor
administration under the military-bureaucratic regime that preceeded the
latest democratic resurgence in the Argentina.?
What should ultimately be apparent is the following. Regime change
influences both public policy and the structure of the state. This change is
more likely to be significant and concretely evident in "core" internal areas
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of state activity such as national labor administration. This is particularly
so in Argentina, where the position of organized labor makes it an important
social group whose interests are a primary concern of the democratic regime
installed in 1983. Moreover, stable democratic regimes in capitalist societies
require the establishment of structural bases of class compromise between
labor and capital. To that end, the democratic state must provide the
institutional framework in which to negotiate and maintain the terms of the
compromise. This requires that the state achieve a significant degree of
normative and operative autonomy that allows it to mediate and enforce the
terms of the compromise in class-neutral fashion. Hence, the role and
organization of national labor administration is a central element of the
Argentine process of democratic consolidation.
One area that warrants separate attention (beyond the scope of this
essay) is the impact of external systemic influences on these processes of
redemocratizaton. In particular, the constraining parameters imposed in each
case by large foreign debt burdens makes especially difficult the task of
institutionalizing the structural bases of democratic class compromise. This
is particularly true in this case, where the legacy of zero-sum authoritarian
solutions weighs heavily n n the new democratic regime. In that light, the
role of lendor-nation government policies in fostering or preventing a
resolution to the debt crisis that allows for the institutionalization of
democratic class compromise in the Argentina and elsewhere deserves close
scrutiny. This is especially true for the policies of Latin America's biggest
trade partner, creditor, and regional military and economic power. That is to
say, even if the parties to the compromise do not cheat, and even if the newly
democratic state serves as the neutral and autonomous arbiter/mediator of the
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tenms of the compromise, the chances of successful redemocratization continue
to hinge on the pressures applied by external, systemic forces (e.g. the prime
rate of interest recommended by the U.S. Treasury).
Finally, it should be noted that the gap between theory and praxis is
seldom fully bridged. Informal rules may weigh more that formal rules,
personalities may outweigh bureaucratic structures and regulations, ad-hoc,
short-term crisis management may replace consistent long-term policy
implementation, etc. In the developing world, complex organizations often
tend to be an amalgam of traditional and modern practices, where charismatic
and technocratic personalities, education and personal ties, impartiality and
bias all have a role to pi ay. 71 Suffice it to say at this point that as such,
Argentine labor administration has evidenced all of the above and then some
during the last half century. The issue to be underscored again is that the
translation of labor policy into practice requires organizational capacity fl rwJ
as such is concretely manifested in the structure and functions of national
labor administration. This institutional framework conditions the range of
choice presented by the current regime to the organized labor movement, which
will ultimately determine whether it is incorporated or not in the democratic
consolidation process.
Given this, the role of the state in promoting the structural bases of
democratic class compromise in Argentina offers the opportunity to view, from
an institutional perspective, the process by which one of the new democratic
regimes in the Southern C ne oves to consolidate. It is to the specific
institutional features of this process that our attention now turns.
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V. The External Dimension
The external dimension of Argentine labor administration involves two
broad and overlapping levels of operation. One level is constituted by the
regime's approach towards the structure of the labor movement itself, which is
designed to promote union democracy in all areas of activity. The other level
involves the simultaneous incorporation of organized labor into the process of
democratic consolidation through the use of tripartite vehicles. Each level
includes a range of tactics involving various mixtures of inducements and
constraints. The fact that the CGT is an institutional pillar of the main
opposition party complicates the achievement of objectives at both levels.
Notwithstanding this, the regime considers both levels to be mutually
reinforcing: a successful approach in the former will increase the likelihood
of success in the latter, which will serve to further strengthen the move
towards union democracy. The formal boundaries of the strategic interaction
between the state and labor are consequently marked by the labor and labor-
related legislation introduced by the government, the strategies adopted by
the labor movement as initiatives or responses to government action, and the
political interplay between labor, capital, the executive branch, and
political parties on specific economic and social issues.
While the Radical administration appears to well understand the
importance of union democracy and labor incorporation in the democratic
consolidation process, it is confronted by serious structural obstacles. To
begin with, it inherited the institutional remnants of the "Proceso"'s
exclusionary program. This includes legal and organizational features such as
the current law of Professional Associations (which was explicitly designed to
break the organizational backbone of the Peronist labor movement), emergency
decrees prohibiting union political activity and strikes (both universally
ignored in the wake of the Malvinas), and a system of interventors who
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controlled union property and finances (including the Obras Social es). In
addition, militarization of the Labor Ministry and the use of direct
intervention in unions obviated many of the functional tasks normally assigned
to labor administration, which consequently reduced the scope of its
activities to little more than enforcing labor acquiesence to the exclusionary
program. '2
Beyond the authoritarian legacy, more formidable obstacles abound. Not
the least of these is the "vertical" structure of the CGT, to which can be
superimposed the obvious fiscal constraints imposed by the foreign debt
repayment schedule. The former is, along with the armed forces, the
government's foremost institutional adversary, even while the subject of a
fierce intra-party dispute. This has produced a negotiating climate which is
conducive to stalemates and logjams over seemingly minor issues. Even so, the
process of labor democratization and incorporation remains a primary concern
of the Alfonsin regime, as it is considered to be a central element in a
larger project of social transformation that is designed to replace
authoritarian institutions and attitudes with democratic equivalents.
The social transformation project accompanying the process of democratic
consolidation Involves, in general terms, the democratization of associational
life in all of its guises. The notion behind this project is that years of
arbitrary and authoritarian rule have inculcated authoritarian attitudes and
structures in Argentine society. The task of promoting democratic frameworks
across all aspects of social life is thus "fundamental not only for the
Government, but for the entire country as well, since long periods of
autocratic rule have prompted different social operators to also autocratic
types of behavior." 73 In other words, broad-based substantive democratization
at the associational level is crucial for the revital ization of society, as
well as for the prevention of future authoritarian regressions. As we shall
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see, with regards to labor administration itself, this means that the move
towards union democracy and labor incorporation be accompanied, on an internal
dimension, by a similar process of "democratization" within the state
apparatus. This is all part of reforming the entire labor relations system in
accordance with the social transformation project. In the words of Labor
Minister Hugo Barrionuevo, the existing labor relations system is "inadequate,
antiquated, and contradictory," and needs to be overhauled via a four-part
program that includes "a restructuring and democratization of labor relations;
an updating of its legal status, which includes repealing authoritarian and
ineffectual norms but not automatically returning to previous laws; defining
the labor instruments that will accompany economic policy and the
mdoernization of the productive apparatus; and promoting greater efficiency in
the Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. "74 Hence, this is a
three-tiered policy approach that combines short and long-term objectives
involving two interrelated dimensions spanning multiple levels of operation.
The social transformation/democratic consolidation project envisioned by
Alfonsin requires that the structure of the labor movement be democratized at
two levels: representation (involving greater plurality and porportional ity,
both ideological and functional), and procedural guarantees (open, competitive
elections, secret bal lots, impartial oversight, etc.). However, this
"horizontal" move, premised on the decentralization and diversification of
syndical organizations, runs directly counter to the present union structure,
and is therefore bound to encounter serious resistance on the part of the
current union leadership. The "vertical" union framework was created by Peron
in the 1940s as an agent of mass mobilization. Emphasizing ideological
purity, centralization, and top-down channels of communication from national
union headquarters to shop floor, it remains as the labor movement's greatest
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source of strength, as it allows for the regular mobilization of human and
material resources in defense of working class (and often partisan) interests
at both the economic and political levels with one unified (Peronist) voice. 75
Unfortunately, this voice has often had an overt authoritarian tone, and has
been accompanied by a high level of corruption and venality, backed by
violence, on the part of the labor leadership. 76 Ultimately, though, the
obstacles posed by the vertical union framework derive from the fact that it
has been this framework that has allowed organized labor to survive repeated
attempts at political and economic exclusion since the demise of the first
Peronist renime. T" us it may well prove equally resistant to non-Peronist
inclusionary attempts as well.
As a result, the task confronting the new democratic state in regards to
the structure of the labor movement is to encourage labor's organizational
strength at the peak association level while at the same time making it more
representative and ideologically diverse through the use of democratic
structures and procedures. Since the entrenched labor elites have
considerable resources at their disposal, this presupposes a deliberate state
bias in favor of approachable Peronist and non-Peronist currents in the union
movement. This involves a most delicate "equilizing" role for the state,
concretely manifest in the government's proposed labor legislation regarding
basic rights of association and associational representation.
It is hoped that once democratized, the labor movement will become more
interested in negotiating on non-partisan, rational grounds the terms of a
democratic class compromise. The new regime would therefore like to
preserve one national labor confederation (the CGT) as the peak association
of the Argentine working class while legislatively re-structuring its internal
organization in order to encourage the representation of independent union
factions. This move towards union democracy thus involves an inclusionary
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state corporatist framework (i.e. one that is highly interventionist and
incorporative) that encourages pyramidal hierarchies of democratic
representation in the constituent organizational components. Eventually, this
should be reflected in an ideologically and functionally diverse array of
openly elected labor representatives exercising legitimate decision-making
authority at the national confederational level.
Using the need to replace the existing authoritarian labor legislation as
an opportunity to rewrite the union charter, the government is also attempting
to prevent the ressurrection of previous labor legislation that would
consolidate the vertical union framework. The government's initial attempt
ended in failure in February, 1984, when Congress rejected a draft bill of a
new Law of Professional Associations that would have required minority
representation at all levels of activity and a decentralized, "horizontal"
federational structure. Thpn } i n an effort to exploit divisions within the
Peronist union leadership (and the fact that most labor leader's terms in
office legally expired during the "Proceso") an attempt is being made, under
International Labour Organization supervision, to electorally "normalize" the
representational status of a wide array of unions. ?? It was believed that
only after the representational status of all unions is "normalized" can
progress in re-drafting the Law of Professional Associations be made. In late
1986 the electoral normalization occurred, with orthodox peronists gaining a
slim majority over the renovadores in the CGT executive council. Even so, the
cleavages between orthodox and renovating Peronists, coupled with the
emergence of viable non-Peronist unions, have not precluded unified
labor-support for the Peronist-drafted labor reform bill, which after
extensive review and debate with Ministry of Labor officials and Radical Party
legislators is now delayed in Congress.
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Another aspect of this level of operation is the move to introduce a new
strike law. In Argentina, mandatory state authorization for "legal" strikes
has precedents dating back to the turn of the century, and has been used for
both inclusionary and exclusionary purposes. 7 ^ The present government wants
to narrow the range of legal strike activity to those of a strictly economic
or professional nature (wages and benefits, working conditions, and the like).
It specifically wants to declare illegal those that are used to ex post facto
modify existing collective bargaining agreements, as well as so-railed
"political" strikes. The former are considered to be violations of trust,
while the latter are believed to be most often used as a partisan tactical
ploy in order to destabilize the government by thwarting the implementation of
economic and social policies, thereby increasing social tensions. For many
official observers, the seven general strikes called by the CGT since Alfonsin
was inaugurated have all been of the latter sort. Even so, strikes have
virtually always had a political character in Argentina, as they are most
often directed against the state rather than at employers per se. 7 ^ Moreover,
prohibitions on ill-defined political strikes -- whatever the economic merit
they are judged to contain -- have been repeatedly used by eyery regime that
has governed Argentina in this century. The task of regulating permissable
strike activity is therefore another delicate issue. This task has now fallen
to Congress, which is currently attempting to define the specifics of a new
strike law based on recommendations made by the Executive branch. For the
moment, the goal in Congress is to forge a multi-partisan consensus on the new
law that will make it more palatable to the labor movement, something that is
far more easy to advocate than accomplish.
Parallel to democratizing the syndical structure and redefining the legal
scope of labor activities, the government has encouraged, at the other,
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broader level of operation, labor incorporation in tripartite vehicles in
relevant policy areas. This includes macro-economic policy areas such as
public employment policy, where the CGT has been invited to discuss with the
government and the private sector the impact that debt-conditioned
rationalization and "privatization" efforts within the public sector have on
the public work force. This includes discussion of possible I. L.O. -sponsored,
tripartite-managed vocational training programs which could ease the transfer
of labor to other economic sectors. ^0 However, a profound lack of absorptive
capacity on the part of the private sector makes these discussions
particularly contentious, as it is clear that Argentine capital offers little
in the way of employment alternatives for displaced labor, much less any
prospect for a long-term solution. In other words, the sacrifices imposed on
the public sector by the debt repayment conditions are disporportionately
levied on the public labor force in ways that go beyond real wage levels or
the elimination of public services, a fact not disguised by the use of
tripartite vehicles.
A more fruitful area for the use of tripartite vehicles is that of
union-operated social security and health programs. As mentioned earlier, the
entire union-operated Obras Social es network, now with financial assets worth
2.5 billion dollars, was taken over by military interventors during the
"Proceso." Before that, it had been used by Peronist union leaders as a huge
patronage system geared towards the illicit material gain of those involved.
While the unions would like to return to the status quo ante, the government
would prefer to centralize administration of the Obras Social es under one
public agency. Given this difference, and understanding that only the
crudest form of revisionism would deny the need to fundamentally restructure
the Obras Social es (by imposing more rigorous accounting procedures on the
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future management, among other things), especially since employers are
required to contribute half of the operating revenues of individual Obras
Social es, tripartite negotiation is considered to be the most appropriate
means for reaching a satisfactory agreement on the future organization of the
system. In fact, as early as December 1983, the government authorized
creation of a tripartite commission, to include representatives of the CGT, to
study the normalization of the Obras Social es. By provisions of the
authorizing decree, this commission was formally made part of the Instituto
Nacional de Obras Sociales (National Institute for Social Welfare or INOS),
and was directly responsible to the Secretary of Health in the Ministerio de
Salud y Accion Social (Ministry of Health and Social Action or MSAS.)^ 1 As we
shall see later, this is part of the "democratizing" trend established within
the state apparatus as well. For the moment it is important to note that
below this national level similar tripartite negotiations on the subject of
individual Obras Sociales are also encouraged, as complementary vehicles,
between individual unions, specific employer groups, and provincial or
municipal authorities. ^2
At an international level, this interest in tripartism has been most
clearly evident in the character of Argentine participation in I.L.O.
activities. Besides the invitation extended to the I.L.O. to oversee the
union elections in the Fall of 1986, and possible I.L.O. participation in
vocational retraining programs, the Argentine delegation to the 1986
International Labour Conference was comprised of senior representatives of the
Ministry of Labor, other government agencies, various employer groups
(particularly the Union Industrial and Conferencia General Economical and the
CGT (including the Secretary General and other leading syndical figures). ^3
Given the I.L.O.'s long standing interest in promoting tripartism, and the
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previous exclusion of non-government sanctioned labor representatives from the
Argentine delegation, this points to strong government interest is
promoting tripartite approaches to labor relations issues.
The most important tripartite vehicle, and which most closely resembles
the archtypical notions of concertacion , is the Conferencia Economico y Social
(CES). Announced by the President in 1985, the CES is designed to provide a
forum in which representatives of the peak associations of capital and labor
are joined by representatives of the branches of the state directly connected
to each (specifically representatives of the Ministries of Economy and Labor)
in order to address a broad range of macro-economic and social issues.
Coupled with the use of tripartite vehicles in more specific (micro) policy
areas, it is believed that this will provide a wider range of insitutional
integrative mechanisms that in turn will help foster the process of
substantive democratization. At the yery least, it is believed that the
formalization of such a tripartite dialogue is a considerable advance over the
episodic, informal discussions that had taken place until then. 84
The CES began with a series of short-term tasks that were deemed
particularly appropriate for tripartite consideration. Foremost among these
was reaching agreement on a reasonable range of salary increases within the
parameters outlined in the Austral Plan. While the government reserved the
right to impose salary increases by executive decree if necessary, it hoped
that an agreement could be reached that provided criteria for negotiating a
limited "band" of salary increases within a minimum "floor" and maximum
"ceiling" established each quarter by the government. 85 As part of this
agreement, it was expected that employers would agree to not raise prices
during the time it was in effect, while labor would agree to refrain from
taking subsequent "measures of force" over the terms. 86 it was hoped that
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this would provide the basis for future collective bargaining in a wide array
of economic sectors, the legal status of which formally remain in suspense
until a new law of collective bargaining is passed. 87
Beyond that, the previously mentioned strike law and union charter are
considered to be excellent subjects for tripartite disucssion within the CES,
as is the more immediate concern with the electoral normalization of unions.
Elsew ^e, the role of the CES extends to social welfare programs in general.
The government proposes to reform the social welfare system on the basis of
"three principles: generation of more resources for the system; a broadening
of welfare services and improved redistribution of major resources; and
government participation in accounting procedures. "88 since this involves
basic issues of taxation, incomes, and government jurisdiction, it includes
discussion of greater participation by both labor and capital in administering
various labor and social agencies, as w°ll as public enterprises. 89
In effect, the range of subjects that organized labor is invited to
discuss through the CES and other tripartite vehicles is quite broad. It
includes discussion of social security, income, vocational training, and
public employment policy, as well as more specific issues related to
investment policy, debt refinancing, domestic staple prices, and wage
restraint in the existing inflationary climate. These are, in a sense, the
terms upon which hinge labor incorporation in the democratic consolidation
process.
Ultimately, the short term use of a highly interventionist approach on
the part of the new democratic regime is designed to foster the establishment
of a substantively democratic institutional network that frees labor and
capital from non-economic concerns when negotiating the term of the class
compromise. That is, the eventual success of tripartite mechanisms will
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diminish their need to continuously negotiate non-wage and non-investment
issups, and will thus allow labor and capital to more directly negotiate the
economic terms of class compromise without the benefit of direct state
mediation. This objective has been made very explicit by both economic and
labor policy makers. According to a memorandum prepared by the Ministry of
Economy in 1984, "(i)t is the intention of the Government to adopt, as soon as
circumstances permit, a policy under which wage determination in the private
sector would be left to direct negotiation between management and labor. "90
In broader perspective, the Labor Minister considers this to be part of the
democratic consolidation process, since it proposes to "exploit the potential
for social autonomy in the face of excessive state intervention (in order to)
undo rigidities that block economic functions . . . Rather than anti-syndical
or anti-business, the government's proposed reforms are designed to define the
protagonic roles that both social sectors should have in a democratic
society. "91
The nobility of these objectives notwithstanding, the CES has so far
proven to be mixed success. Aftp- several earlier walkouts, the CGT formally
abandoned the tripartite dialogue in June, 1986, in the wake of a government
ordered salary readjustment. Subsequent initiatives to reach some form of
"Pacto Social" have foundered on the shoals of sectoral intransigence. Labor
continues to use its strike capacity as a political weapon. And yet, the push
for tripartite negotiation has produced some notable successes. This seeming
contradiction is best explained by the internal situation within the CGT,
which is anything but normal.
The CGT most recently divided on strategic and generational grounds in
1983, during the initial process of re-democratization A younger generation
of Peronist unionists, represented by such as the current Secretary-General of
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the CGT, Saul Ubaldini (a former brewery union officer), adovcated a more
confrontational (militant) posture with regard to the outgoing military
regime. Th e older generation of Peronist leaders, led by Lorenzo Miguel of
the Metalworkers Union, preferred a more negotiated strategy in order to align
the CGT more favorably with the outgoing regime (perhaps in an attempt to
secure a favorable outcome in the elections or in the event of an
authoritarian regression). Identified by the streets on which their
respective headquarters were located, the "dialoguist" CGT-Azopardo and
"confrontationist" CGT-Brasil (as the two factions were known) engaged in a
struggle for the loyalty of Peronist unionists that continues to this day. 92
One short-term effect of this struggle was the electoral defeat of the
Peronists in the 1983 elections, since many disenchanted unionists opted to
support Radical Party candidates rather than their traditional political
patrons. Today Ubaldini and Miguel continue to play the principal parts in
the ongoing feud, to which can be added a strong reformist ideological current
and the presence of non-Peronist unions of considerable significance.
Reformist Peronist unionists, more democratic in orientation than the leaders
of either of the CGT factions encompassed in the so-called "62 Organizations,"
have begun to infiltrate both these and the independent unions. Their
presence is most evident in the so-called "25 Organizations" of the
"renovating current." More significantly, their ties with the reformist branch
of the Peronist party has created a new current within the Peronist movement
which is strongly felt in Congress (most often in the tone of discourse during
debate about proposed labor legislation, less in the tabulation of votes).
To these new faces can be added, often in the same union, those of
Radical and Intransigent Party loyalists such as those who share control of
the "25 Organizations," and who dominate the "group of 20" independent unions.
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These and other independent unions include over thirty percent of the total
union membership, and cover strategically important sectors such as those
representing public education and health workers, commercial bank employees,
and various private enterprises. 93 Many of the independent unions have
especially strong ties to the most militant factions of the non-Peronist
parties, including the Franja Morada movement in the Radical Party (which is
also particularly strong among university student groups, who constitute the
intellectual counterparts of the younger labor generation), and the mil itante
wing of the Intrasigentes. In fact, the presence of extremists within the
latter has caused some Peronist labor leaders to voice concern that it is
being used as a vehicle to "smuggle Montoneros back into the labor
movement. "94
In any ase, with the labor movement so divided, the task of union
electoral normal iz^n and re-drafting of the union charter have become foci
of immediate attention. While internal posturing within the CGT, the Radical
Party, and Congressional stalemates of both the procedural and substantive
variety have slowed progress on both fronts, the government persists in its
effort to accomplish its mission of labor restructuration. More importantly,
the factional ization of the labor movement has allowed the government to
achieve its first victories in the labor field, and has opened the door to
further tripartite collaboration in the future.
This is because the government was prescient enough to have a two-pronged
strategy for negotiating with the CGT. First came the invitation to negotiate
the salary adjustment measures within the CES. In the event of the expected
failure of this approach (due to CGT intransigence), the second option called
for a salary adjustment (along the lines stated earlier) via decree, which
opened the way for more individualized negotiation in various economic
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sectors. This was designed to take advantage of the fact that, because of the
internal dispute within the CGT, organized labor had not one spokesman, "but
close to 500, which was also the approximate number of outstanding collective
bargaining agreements. "95 Moreover, the general parameters of the salary
adjustment were worked out by a "technical commission comprised of lawyers
from the ministries of Labor and Economy, from the business organizations
invited to the CES (the Union Industrial and Conferencia General Economica),
and from the directive council of the CGT. It was the result of the common
effort of lawyers from the three sectors. "96 Hence, prior tripartite agreement
strengthened the claim to legitimacy of the salary readjustment decree, which
was implemented as such only after the CGT withdrew from the CES. In fact,
the CGT had initially agreed to the terms of the salary adjustment package,
with the exception of one clause inseted by the business representatives
specifying that wage increases could not be directly translated into price
increases. 97 When the CGT, using an internal logic of its own, walked out of
the CES for reasons that clearly lie outside the purview of CES concerns, the
package was implemented by decree. 98
This strategy calculated correctly, as most unions opted to negotiate on
the basis of the government offer. Hence, respecting the limits of the
adjustment package, "57 percent of all private workers were able to have their
salaries adjusted, *s 70 unions representing 2.3 million people reached
agreements. "99 Moreover, virtually all of these contracts contained "social
peace" clauses that committed the unions to refrain from striking for the
duration of the agreement.
Among the unions that took advantage of the opportunity to "sincere"
their salaries was the Metalworkers Union headed by Lorenzo Miguel (as well as
several other major unions such as the Textile and Plastics Unions). Most of
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the unions loyal to Ubaldini refused to negotiate (particularly those
representing employees in the public sector) , and now lag behind in terms of
real wage levels. This has bred resentment against the Secretary-General,
which in turn is viewed as a tactical opening that his rivals both within and
without the union movement can exploit. Miguel even went so far as to thank
the Minister of Economy for his role in drawing up the adjustment package, a
remarkable gesture in light of the strained relationship that post has
traditionally had with the labor movement. This also points to fundamental
differences in the strategies adopted by the different CGT factions: Miguel
prefers to talk to the government (much as he had during the early stage of
re-democratization) in order to secure piecemeal concessions, while Ubaldini
(following his previous strategy) prefers to talk -- a la Peron, some say --
to the masses. 100 xne differences between the two strategies ultimately boil
down to different notions of leverage based on opposing perceptions of the
advantages accrued by cooperative or confrontational approaches.
The importance of attracting the support of influential unions such as
the Metalworkers has long been understood by Argentine governments. 101 Even
critics of the Alfonsin regime see the value of this strategy, since "the
metalworkers union carries out a directive function in the industrial economy.
It serves as an example for other unions, sweeping by virtue of demonstration
effect other occupations of a diverse nature, and determines labor cost levels
and prices in a number of related activities. "102 Hence, the approval of the
government's salary adjustment package given by the Metalworkers eased the way
for other Peronist union's acceptance of the decree. Moreover, it offered
mutual benefits to both sides: the government gained support within the CGT,
while the "dialoguist" faction saw its position strengthened vis-a-vis the
"confrontational ist" bloc. Abetted by the challenges of non-Peronist unions,
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this has intensified competition within the CGT, since the very
representativeness of the present leadership is open to serious question.
Under the terms of the salary adjustment decree, tripartite collective
bargaining has been undertaken in both the public and private sectors with
considerable success. For example, a salary adjustment commission made up of
representative of the ministries of Labor and Economy, Secretariat of Public
Affairs, Secretariat of Public Enterprise Control, Civil Service Union, and
the State Workers Association established the rates of readjustment for a
variety of occupational categories within the civil service. ^3 Similar
arrangements have been used extensively in the private sector. In fact,
roughly half of the new private sector agreements involved tripartite
negotiation, while the other half were reached without state mediation. In
this sense, the regime's longer-term objective of restoring the autonomy of
labor and capital is gradually being achieved (at least partially, and for the
moment)
.
It is believed that wide acceptance of the salary adjustment decree,
direct labor-capitol negotiations, and the increased factional ization of the
Peronist union leadership all have a salutory effect on the labor relations
system, and are thus the first steps in the democratic incorporation of
Argentine labor. According to a former Assistant Secretary of Labor, now "
. . .
it is possible to abandon (the practice of) centralized intervention in
salary negotiations, and move on to a system of autonomous negotiation. The
very nature of labor conflicts will therefore change. Rather than
superpolitical confrontations without resolution, a move has been made towards
a situation that is more typical of any industrial society, where the
negotiators are the principals in labor relations, and where the State assumes
a secondary role." 104 Coupled with the erection on tripartite institutional
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mechanisms in related policy areas, these are considered to be the necessary
institutional conditions for the achievement of democratic class compromise.
If so, it is possible that the democratic consolidation/social transformation
process is beginning to take root, whi<~h would be a major step forward in the
history of Argentine class relations.
In sum, the condition of the labor movement has allowed the Alfonsin
regime to take the initiativ -'n determining the nature of the strategic
interaction between government, capital, and labor. While ultimately
incorporative and positive sum in orientation, this approach has promoted
outcomes that reinforce a decentralizing and diversifying trend within the
labor movement. In this respect, it shares a policy approach with the
military-bureaucratic regimes that have preceeded it, since for both,
elimination of the vertical union framework is considered to be a necessary
condition for the successful implementation of labor policy. The difference
between the two approaches, however, is more substantial: the current
approach is inherently inclusionary , and thus premised on a positive
conceptualization of the role labor plays i n Argentine society, while the
military-bureaucratic approach, as is now well known, was premised on an
extremely negative conceptualization of labor's ~ le in society, and hence was
profoundly exclusionary.
Thus, on an external dimension, the Alfonsin regime is attempting to
offer, as an incorporative vehicle, institutionalized tripartism based on
inclusionary state corporatist schemes of interest group intermediation which
emphasize inducements for cooperation (rather than constraints on interest
group activities). This approach encourages pyramidal, decentraliz d,
diversified, and autonomous representation within the peak associations of
major interest groups, a feature which is considered to an essential part in
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the move towards substantive democracy. Eventually, it is hoped this will
allow for direct labor-capital negotiation of the economic terms of the class
compromise, with tripartite mechanisms providing the broader institutional
network in which that can occur. This is not to say that the process is
foolproof, near completion, or not susceptible to reversal. External
constraints in the form of the debt climate make the outcome particularly
difficult to achieve. The point is that Argentine labor is now at a critical
historical juncture, as it looks for a second generation incorporative vehicle
to replace the outmoded, populist-authoritarian, inclusionary state
corporatist framework. While the CGT can still marshall considerable
resources in pursuit of constructive, obstructive, or destructive goals
(depending on which factional perspective is dominant), it is clear that it no
longer enjoys the near-universal credibility of yore, and is susceptible to
change at the hands of both external and internal forces. It is precisely
this window of opportunity that the government is trying to exploit, in order
to bring about the institutional transformation that is essential for the
success of the democratic consolidation process.
One final irony is worth mentioning. As we have seen, the labor movement
is currently undergoing a major restructuration, one that is designed to make
it more democratic and responsive to the needs of society as a whole.
Conversely, while Argentine capital has plenty of institutional stability to
offer in support of the social transformation/democratic consolidation
process, its interest in the project and reliability as a social partner are
by no means certain. Instead, it is clear that a large fraction of the
financial and industrial bourgeoise (to say nothing of the landed elite)
believe that rationally calculated grounds of material self-interest advise
them to invest elsewhere. The Argentine working class has no such choice of
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course. Thus, the Argentine government must provide appropriate incentives
and disincentives in order to encourage Argentine capital to invest at home,
since domestic (re) investment is an essential condition for the achievement
of a democratic class compromise. Obviously enough, this a major concern of
labor as well. Yet structural conditions mitigate against this is ways that
transcend the field of labor relations. For example, agricultural interests
resist domestic staple price ceilings that are pegged below the international
market rate, and have little concern for their impact on domestic wage scales
(since the nature of their product is not labor-intensive). However, for a
majority of industrial capital as well as urban workers, the government's
ability to overcome agro-sector resistance to staple price ceilings is crucial
for determining wage scales. The government, in turn, is heavily dependent on
agro-export revenues for public financing, and can therefore ill-afford to
provoke the export sector into adopting destabilizing tactics (such as
withholding crops from market). Under such conditions, industrial capital
prefers to invest elsewhere, in countries where structural conditions are more
favorable. These cross-cutting interests have long rested at the heart of the
Argentine quandry, and are what will ultimately determine whether the new
democratic regime succeeds or fails.
Even so, the Alfonsin regime has shown a capacity to explore several new
avenues that are conducive to the achievement of a democractic class
compromise in Arqentina. W° ha*"e seen how it has approached the external
dimension of national labor administration in pursuit of this goal. It is now
time to turn to an examination of its approach to the internal dimension that
is a necessary complement to the external approach. This internal dimension
is constituted by the structure of the state apparatus itself, and
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particularly the branch directly responsible for administering organized labor
interests.
VI. The Internal Dimension
Structure
Shortly after assuming office, the Radical government reorganized the
state apparatus. It began by passing a new Law of Ministries (Law 22,520/10
December 1983) which reduced the number of cabinet level portfolios to eight,
and which moved to functionally rationalize the division of labor within the
public sphere. The -ationale behind this reorganization was twofold: first,
to overcome the negative structural legacies inherited by the new democratic
regime, which were the product of the cumulative effects of the preceeding
populist authoritarian and military bureaucratic periods. Second, to promote
a form of national state organization that is conducive to democratic
government and modes of interaction throughout civil society. The arbitrary
and highly discretionary nature of the state's role under the preceeding three
regimes (dating back to 1966) required a major overhaul of its basic
organizational framework, including a major reformulation of the division of
1 abor within it.
As part of this reorganization, all labor-related activities, now defined
so as to include labor welfare responsibilities, were place under the
jurisdiction of the Ministerio de Trabajo y Sequridad Social (Ministry of
Labor and Social Security, or MTSS). The MTSS was delegated general
responsibility for implementing -- but not formulating (a point we shall
return to later) -- labor policy nation-wide. ^5 Thus, among the primary
duties of the MTSS are registering and regulating the activities of officially
recognized unions, mediating and arbitrating labor disputes, approving and
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mediating (where pertinent) collective bargaining agreements, enforcing safe
working conditions, and administering union-related social security
programs. 106 In this fashion the corporative and interventionist character of
Argentine labor administration has been reaffirmed. This follows a well-
established trend throughout Latin America. ^7
The organization of the MTSS, as the lead agency in the national labor
administration system, reflects the regime's intention to "democratize" the
public sphere. This is structually manifest in efforts to functionally
compartmentalize and horizontally diversify the various tasks assigned to the
MTSS. Th^ eternal responsibilities of the MTSS (that is, those that involve
direct contact with the labor movement), are divided between two functionally
-defined "cylinders," each headed by a Secretariat that is directly
responsible to the Minister of Labor and Social Security (the term "cylinder,"
rather than "branch" is used to give more dimension to the concept, as it
accounts for roles and patterns of internal interaction that more linear
descriptions overlook). The Secretaria de Trabajo (Secretariat of Labor) is
charged with all those functions related to labor relations per se, while the
Secretaria de Seguridad Social (Secretariat of Social Security) is responsible
for overseeing labor- "el ated social welfare tasks. On the internal side (that
is, at the administrative level), the Secretaria de Administracion y
Coordinacion Tecnica (Secretariat of Administration and Technical
Coordination) is responsible for the daily operation of the MTSS, including
all management, personnel, and logistical responsibilities. Each functional
cylinder contains a Secretary, Assistant Secretary, National or General
Directorates (depending on whether they are external or internally-oriented,
respectively), Directorates, Departments, Divisions, and Offices. Each
hierarchical level corresponds to an increased degree of functional
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specialization. Normal vertical hierarchies apply within each cylinder, with
horizontal interaction occuring between similarly ranked agencies. More
broadly, horizontal interaction between the different cylinders occurs at the
level of Secretariat, which in all cases answer directly to the Minister's
Office. The latter contains a number of advisory agencies, including legal
counsel, several technical advisory bodies on specific labor-related subjects,
and the Office of International Affairs, which is the main point of contact
with other government labor agencies and international organizations such as
the I.L.O. More importantly, there exist several "Technical" Secretariats
staffed by political appointees which serve as part of the Minister's senior
staff.
The division of responsibilities within each cylinder further
demonstrates the regime's effort to compartmentalize and decentralize the
labor relations system. Within the Secretaria de Trabajo several agencies
stand out. These include the Direccion Nacional de Asuntos Gremiales
(National Directorate of Union Affairs), which is responsible for maintaining
a register of legally recognized unions, supervising union elections, and
conferring or withdrawing the legal status of unions at all levels of
activity. The Direccion Nacional de Trabajo (National Directorate of Labor)
is charged with all mediation and arbitration duties, enforcing strike
legislation, and other juridical responsibilities involving labor grievences,
both individual and collective. This includes responsibility for maintaining,
in cooperation with provincial authorities, a nation-wide system of Tribunales
de Trabajo (Labor Tribunals) in which worker grievences can be heard in the
first instance. The other main agency in the external cyclinder is the
Direccion Nacional de Recursos Humanos y Empl eo (National Directorate of Human
Resources and Employment), which is responsible for overseeing all
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federally-funded vocational training, professional classification,
rehabilitation, and research activities in the labor field. This includes
monitoring the labor market in general, work force levels, sectoral
distribution, unemployment, and labor migration patterns.
In the social security cylinder, a similar division of responsibilities
is evident. One primary agency is the Direccion Nacional de Hygiene y
Seguridad Social (National Directorate of Health and Social Security), which
is responsible for all work-related health programs. This includes inspection
duties to ensure industry compliance with safe work standards, research
oriented towards improving health and safety conditions in the work place,
rural health issues (such as vaccination campaigns for agricultural workers in
tropical regions, administered in conjunction with the MSAS), and all other
activities connected with the working environment, or which are designed to
improve the physical condition of the working population (as part of a larger
effort to increase national productivity). Another important agency is the
Direccion Nacional de Seguridad Social (National Directorate of Social
Security or DNSS), which is responsible for overseeing the national social
security system, including health, leave, and pension benefits that are at
least in part funded by wag° deductions. More specific to union concerns,
this includes a major role in administering the Obras Social es, since the
state's portion of funding to these union-operated progr ams is split between
the DNSS, INOS, and the MSAS. Because the bulk of labor-state interaction
currently revolves around issues addressed by the labor-related cylinder, the
social security cylinder is more insulated from political pressures. In other
words, the nature of current labor-state interaction, which revolves around
issues addressed by the labor relations cylinder, allows for a higher degree
of operative autonomy in the social security cylinder. This gives the
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external side of Argentine labor administration a two dimensional character
based on the different levels of autonomy achieved by the two externally-
related branches. More generally, the functional compartmental ization of
responsibilities within the external branches not only assures a more
equitable division of labor within the MTSS, it also encourages a similar
organizational response from organiz d labor (since no one agency can address
the full scope of labor demands).
The administrative cylinder, as mentioned before, encompasses all those
agencies assigned internal administrative functions, including supply,
comptroller, and personnel -related duties. AS such it is well insulated from
external pressures.
The jurisdiction of the MTSS is national in scope, although the
government prefers to allow municipal and provincial authorities precedence in
addressing labor issues within their respective jurisdictions. Regional
delegates overseen by the Secretary of Labor serve as points of contact with
local labor authorities. Tu e MTSS continues to serve as the national
implementory body in the labor relations field, and as such is the agency of
last recourse in the national labor administration system (beyond which the
courts are required to intervene directly). This reflects the regime's
commitment to the federal parameters of the Argentine constitutional system,
and is in marked contrast to the superordinate role played by national labor
authorities under the previous regime.
More significantly, while it has a wide array of implementory duties, the
MTSS has no formal responsibility for formulating labor policy. That task
falls to the President and Congress, with specific issues being addressed by
the aforementioned tripartite organizations, particularly the CES (which is
officially part of the executive branch). As such, the MTSS shares positions
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in the CES with representatives of the Ministry of Economy, business
organizations, a n ^ the CGT, plus the Presidency and Congress. This
heterogeneous group bring eir different perspectives and experience to bear
on the discussion of labor policy, from which emerge (albeit often
sporadically, depending on the attitude of individual participants at
particular points in time) specific decisions that are implemented by the
MTSS. It was in this fashion that the MTSS became the primary instrument
through which the salary adjustment package agreed upon in the CES was
translated into concrete agreements in a variety of economic sectors.
This organizational framework is designed to encourage labor to voice
comprehensive demands within the confines of the CES, with more specific
concerns handled by a technically and legally defined network of specialized
agencies. In this way, it is believed, consensus agreements reached in the
tripartite forum can be disspassionately implemented, without partisan
interference, by neutral and autonomous state agencies.
A significant aspect of this institutional framework is the proliferation
of non-elected representatives of the social partners within the CES. For
the most part labor lawyers or specialists in labor-related social security
and health issues, these sectoral appointees serve as the permanent staff and
executive body of the CES. Outnumbering the elected representatives of
capital and labor as well as cabinet and other upper-level officers, these
appointed positions, porportionately divided among the three partners,
comprise the core of state managers responsible for supervising and mediating
negotiations over the terms of the class compromise. The appointed nature of
these positions is designed to place them beyond both overt partisan concerns
and factional disputes within each sector. This ostensibly endows them with a
measure of f^nnulative autonomy which, when added to the normative autonomy of
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the implementory branches, qives the state sufficient "distance" -- and
perspective -- vis-a-vis both labor and capital when administering the terms
of the compromise.
Another interesting aspect of this organizational approach is that it
closely parallels, with some modifications, the framework erected by the
Frondizi limited democratic regime of 1958-1962. That regime, which also had
Radical origins, was the first Argentine regime to attempt to functionally
compartmentalize and decentralize national labor administration in an effort
to promote a degree of institutional neutrality and autonomy that would be
conducive to cordial class relations, if not democratic class compromise.
This effort was replicated by the Radical regime headed by Arturo Illia from
1963 to 1966. ^08 since then, although certain structural traits were
preserved and/or periodically resurrected by the succeeding military
bureaucratic and populist authoritarian regimes, this general framework was
abandoned in favor of organizational schemes that were deemed to be better
suited for their different labor projects (of the populist authoritarian,
inclusionary corporatist or military bureaucratic, exclusionary corporatist
variants). The return of democracy has therefore brought with it another
attempt at a neutral, technically-defined approach to national labor
administration. However, rather than merely repeat the cycle, this attempt
also includes the use of tripartite policy formulation mechanisms as major
agents of non-partisan incorporation. In this sense, it is not only vastly
different from the labor projects of the preceeding authoritarian regimes; it





Comprehensive budgetary information for the MTSS since 1983 is virtually
impossible to obtain, especially below the cabinet level. However, while
incomplete, a general budgetary picture for 1984-1986 is available, and thus
offers a basic indicator of the regime's approach towards national labor
administration. The information is both surprising and revealing, as 0.77
(1984), 0.975 (1985), and 0.97 percent (1986) of central administrative
expenditures have been directed towards the MTSS and related agencies. ^9
While a small fraction of the total central administrative budget, these
figures are significant for two main reasons. First, with limited material
benefits to distribute (unlike agencies primarily charged with the provision
of public goods, such as the MSAS), most of the budget is consumed by
personnel costs, administrative necessities, and the state contribution to
union social security programs administered by the Secretaria de Seguridad
Social. Second, even while the number of people employed in the MTSS and
related agencies is relatively low when compared with other branches of the
state, it would appear that most are occupied in well-paid technical
positions. This means that the level of expertise required for employment in
the MTSS is relatively high, and thus comparatively well renumerated, which
would support Offe's inference that recognized specialization among state
managers is important for the autonomy of the democratic state. Most
important of all, these figures represent the highest percentage of central
administrative expenditures allocated to national labor administration in over
thirty years, since the last budget formulated by the first Peronist regime
(which had organized labor as its main support base). A comparison with the
previous Mght regimes reveals the magnitude of this increase (See Table 1).
Even if we factor in the large cuts in defense- related expenditures undertaken
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by the Alfonsin government, the oppositional position of organized labor in
the current regime and the financial constraints imposed on the public sector
by the debt repayment schedule make this outlay all the more remarkable. In
effect, it appears that the budgetary re-emphasis awarded this policy area
represents an institutional manifestation of the regime's understanding of the
importance of labor incorporation in the democratic consolidation process.
Personnel
The government's intention to instill a measure of neutrality and
impartiality in national labor administration is evident in its appointment of
upper-echelon personnel. Two of the three Labor Ministers appointed to date,
Antonio Mucci and Hugo Barrionuevo, are former independent unionists with ties
to both the Peronist and Radical Parties. Mucci 's tactical mistake of
proposing to push for a new Law of Professional Associations immeditely after
Alfonsin was inaugurated cost him his job in early 1984 (after the Peronist-
controlled Senate rejected his draft bill). Barrionuevo represented
the same currents advocated by Mucci, to whi>h can be added a more diplomatic
personality. His obvious lack of authority relative to other cabinet officers
(particularly the Minister of Economy) and unrepresentative status in the eyes
of the labor movement forced him to resign in April 1987. His replacement,
Miguel Alderete, is past president of the Utility Workers Union Luz y Fuerza,
and a leader of the orthodox Peronist faction in the CGT. His appointment was
designed to boltser the government's support for the Ortodoxos in the inter-
union disputes while simultaneously providing the first concrete evidence of
the government's interest in co-participation. However, given the
superordinate position of the Ministry of Economy in the cabinet, this may
well be little more than a symbolic gesture that was designed more to deepen
the Peronist divisions prior to the September 1987 congressional and
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gubernatorial elections rather than allow for the incorportion of a
significant segment of organized labor in the policy-making process.
Beneath the cabinet level, expertise in labor affairs and/or legal
training in labor relations dominates the backgrounds of incumbents in
important posts. The previous Secretary and Assistant Secretary of Labor,
Roberto Bigatti and Jose Armando Caro Figueroa, are lawyers with extensive
experience in labor affairs. Their successors are union lawyers of the
orthodox Peronist current, of them all Caro Figueroa provides a fascinating
insight into the government's approach to labor policy.
Son of a former Peronist Senator, Caro Figueroa spent several years
during the "Proceso" in voluntary exile in Spain. There he worked as legal
advisor to the socialist labor federation, the Union General de Trabajadores
(UGT), and as such was actively involved in formulating that federations'
approach to the first socioeconomic "pact" achieved by the restored Spanish
democracy (the Pacto de Moncloa 1977). For this, coupled with his personal
background, he has come to be known as an "Europeronista" (Europeronist)
.
As Assistant Secretary and later Secretary of Labor, he was considered to be a
primary architect of the government's labor policy, and particularly the
effort to institute tripartite vehicles for labor incorporation into the
democratic consolidation process. His presence also weighed heavily within
the MTSS, where he had direct control of the labor relations cylinder and over
the labor legislation subcommittee in the Chamber of Deputies. HO Such
influence was not always appreciated. According to a CGT declaration, this
approach "is inspired by experiments and legislation of undoubtable European
origins (as part of) a conditioned (process of) development which has failed
to diagnose and treat new social phenomena. "HI
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Even so, it is also apparent that significant parts of the labor movement
see the appointment of such individuals in positive light. Many unionists
consider MTSS personnel as their main allies in the Executive branch.
"Syndical sources estimate that two positions exist. . ." on matters of labor
policy: "that of officials in the Labor and Interior Ministries, which are
flexible in regards to the salary question, and which are not compatible with
the rigid posture of the Ministry of Economy." 1^ Thus, "Barrionuevo and
Troccoli (the Interior Minister, and another indivdual with strong ties to
labor), among other officials, are considered to be more permeable by syndical
demands. "^-^ This cliental istic orientation has translated into differences
on basic questions such as wage adjustment policy. Wiile the MTSS favors
quarterly increases tied to the cost of living, the Ministry of Economy
prefers trimesterly adjustments with fixed ceilings, since it believes that
the MTSS position is conducive, rather than contrary to inflation. "4
The effort to establish personal bases for a reapprochment with organized
labor is also evident in the appointment of German Lopez as Secretary-General
of the Presidency, which is the closest advisory position to the President.
Prior to his dismissal in June 1986 in an unrelated scandal, Lopez was an
active participant in the labor scene, and has long-standing (although often
acrimonious) ties to the Peronist Party. Among many other positions, he has
previously occupied posts in the Labor Ministry under Frondizi and Illia.
Another position in which the government's approach towards labor is evident
is that of Secretary of State (not to be confused with the U.S. position),
which is part of the President's executive council. Leonardo Dimase, the
current occupant, is a distinguished academician who previously wrote
extensively about labor issues and published the Informes DIL , a monthly
newsletter dedicated to the subject. Known for his sympatheic ties to the
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unions, he provides a major point of contact between the President and the CGT
leadership (and in fact has set up several direct meetings between the
President and various union leaders).
In both the Social Security and Administrative branches, the criteria for
selection hinges on educational or practical training. Thus, the
administrative cylinder is staffed by career public servants and accountants,
while the social security branch contains large numbers of health service
administrators and medical doctors. This is carried over to the INOS, where
the original director, Jorge Mera, is a medical doctor who has written
extensively about the Obras Social es and the need for reform in the social
security system. Only in the Secretaries Tecnicas is overt partisan content
dominant, and lately has shifted from a Radical to an orthodox Peronist
character.
The basic point is that, given the importance of personal ties in
Argentine politics, the appointment of these individuals is a clear move to
give national labor administration a sympathetic, yet bi-partisan character.
This relative neutrality and high levels of experience are considered to be
integral steps in establishing a measure of institutional autnomy within
national labor administration, and currently give policy implementation its
(ostensibly) "apolitical" character.
VII. Conclusion
From this review, three things should be evident. First and most
obviously, regime type (*nd reg-'m~ change) has a significant impact on public
policy, particularly in "core" "reas of state activity such as interest group
intermediation. Second, this impact is manifest on two interrelated
dimensions. On a external dimension, the content of public policy shifts, as
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Ozslak and O'Donnell theorized several years ago, according to the different
regime objectives in specific policy areas. In the case examined here, the
shift was from an exclusionary to an inclusionary state corporatist approach
towards national labor administration, to which can be added the particular
nuances that differentiate this latest attempt from previous populist
authoritarian experiments with inclusionary corporatism. On a internal
dimension, which is more often overlooked, the structure of the state
apparatus in important policy areas also shifts in order to better pursue
external policy objectives. In fact, reorganization of the state apparatus,
at least in modern Argentina, is an integral part of regime change, as it is
considered to be a necessary complement to, when not prerequisite for, major
shifts in public policy.
Third and most importantly, it is clear that the institutionalization of
class compromise is a fundamental block in the process of democratic
consolidation that follows the transitionary period of re-democratization.
Though the strategies and specific institutional mechanisms may vary from
democratic regime to democratic regime and country to country, the
democratization of class relations in dependent capitalist societies
ultimately revolves around two linked axes: participation of labor in national
political and economic decision-making. The issue of political participation
is addressed through the re-vital ization of associational life among the
working classes, paticularly in regards to their collective agonts and
political representatives. The issue of economic participation revolves
around the hard choices involved in negotiating mutually satisfactory wage
versus investment strategies. We have seen that the present government in
Argentina has attempted to promote both fronts by using an approach based on
the belief in tripartite cooperation among democratically choosen (and
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hence authentically representative) peak associations of major interest
groups, complemented by partisan competition between traditional political
parties. Despite the problems involved in promoting such an arrangement, it is
clear that the newly democratic Argentine state must provide the institutional
framework in which negotiation of the economic terms of the class compromise
can occur, and thus must take the lead in promoting the process of democratic
consolidation. This is because in the end, these economic terms, political
arrangements, and related institutional conditioners all depend on the state
as an ultimate enforcement agency. More importantly, these elements together
constitute the structural bases of a democratic class compromise.
We have seen that the process of institutional democratization is now
underway in Argentina. However, its future is by no means assured: witness
the repeated calls for nation-wide strikes issued by the CGT, the revelation
of a major bank scandal involving government insiders who attempted to
circumvent the limitations imposed by the Austral Plan, and what is most
worrisome, an increasingly generalized belief that the Austral Plan has failed
(which opens the way for the resumption of traditional egotistic competition
between sectoral interests) ,H5 Hence, with external and internal conditions
mitigating against economic stabilization and interest group cooperation, the
government's well-intentioned effort at labor incorporation may simply not be
enough. In that case, the stage is set for a return to the zero-sum economic
and political competition -- and authoritarian solutions -- that have
dominated Argentina during the last half century.
In order to not end on a cynical and pessimistic note that many would
consider to be tipicamente Argentino
,
let me restate the importance that the
split within the Peronist movement has for the proce ee of 6emnc^^ 4--i c
consolidation. The emergence of non-authoritarian currents within Peronism,
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including the labor movement, offers Alfonsin the opportunity to press his
case for institutional democracy in a way his predecessors could not.
Combined with the traumas of the last decade, generational change, and the
emergence of new social movements such as feminism, environmental ism, and
pacifism, this may well be the moment of transition from procedural to
substantive democracy in Argentina. The question to end with is therefore the
following: which way is Argentina going to go? Will it return to the
melancholy cycle of political instability and violence, as if it were some
nostalgic tango to be replayed endlessly on a well-worn vitrola? Or will it
learn from the past and open itself to the possibilities of the future, in
which new steps and patterns of interaction create the conditions for an
equitable and egalitarian social dialogue? It is these questions that lie at
the heart of this attempt at democratic consolidation. For the moment, it
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